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Bridging Data Gaps through Modeling and Evaluation of
Surrogates: Use of the Best Available Science to
Protect Biological Diversity Under the
National Forest Management Act
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN
INTRODUCTION
The implementation of environmental law and policy often, if not typically,
proceeds in the face of scientific uncertainty. Indeed, as Holly Doremus has
explained, "[tihe most universally recognized feature of environmental problems is
the pervasive uncertainty that surrounds them."1 Legislators or administrative
agencies crafting programs to minimize the risk that exposure to pollution will
cause adverse human health effects often lack information about the pathways of
exposure, the levels at which exposure will cause adverse effects, or even about the
kinds of adverse effects that may result from exposure. Nearly thirty years ago,
Talbot Page described nine characteristics that exemplify the kind of
"environmental risk" problems typified by the leakage of hazardous waste or the
production of toxic chemicals. 2 Four of those characteristics emphasized scientific
uncertainty, and Page listed "ignorance of mechanism" as the first characteristic of
an environmental risk problem. 3 Scientific uncertainty is no less endemic to natural
resource management regimes, 4 transforming scientific disputes concerning such
* Robert W. Wagstaff Professor of Law, University of Kansas; Member Scholar,
Center for Progressive Reform. Thanks to Batsheva Glatt, Class of 2007, for her valuable
research and editing assistance. Thanks also to Andrew Torrance for his useful insights on
the scientific method. Finally, thanks to all of the participants at the conference on "Missing
Information: Environmental Data Gaps in Conservation and Chemical Regulation" that was
held at the University of Indiana-Bloomington on March 24, 2006 (and particularly John
Applegate and Robert Fischman, the conference organizers) for a lively and informative
discussion of issues raised by agency efforts to bridge scientific data gaps in environmental
law.
1. Holly Doremus, Constitutive Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
295, 319 (2003); see also Carol M. Rose, Environmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and
What Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 273, 274 (2005) (stating that "in
environmental areas the problem of decisionmaking under uncertainty is particularly acute");
Robert N. Stavins, What Baseball Can Teach Policymakers, 22 ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 2005,
at 14 (asserting that "[u]ncertainty is an absolutely fundamental aspect of environmental
problems and the policies that are employed to address those problems" and that "[any
analysis that fails to recognize this runs the risk not only of being incomplete, but misleading
as well").
2. Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 207, 208-09 (1978).
3. Id. Cass R. Sunstein distinguishes between "risk, for which probabilities can be
assigned to various outcomes, and uncertainty, for which no probabilities can be assigned."
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 841, 848 (2006).
4. See, e.g., John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn from a River? Managing
Uncertainty in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REv. 719, 723 (1999) (stating that
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regimes into judgment calls "about how incomplete data are interpreted and
applied.",5 In both areas, "the most important decisions must be made under
extreme conditions of scientific uncertainty.' '6
Despite this pervasive uncertainty, Congress has directed the agencies
responsible for administering the environmental statutes to ground their policy
decisions in science. The implicit assumption reflected in many of these laws is that
"science would drive decision-making and that agencies could interpret scientific
information to set the right policies." 7 For a variety of reasons, however, an inquiry
that may be posed in scientific terms may have no single correct answer, or even no
answer at all.8 These may include insufficient research, incomplete theoretical
understandings, or "merely the great complexity of natural and human systems."
9
As a result, as one court put it in an early case involving regulation of toxic water
pollutants, environmental statutes often present agencies with "a veritable paradox
[by] calling.., for knowledge of that which is unknown."l 0
Agencies sometimes cope with the responsibility of making science-based
decisions despite the presence of uncertainty by relying on scientific models, or
otherwise using the limited information available to them, to make predictions
about the impacts of agency decisions on the environment. In trying to ascertain the
effects of a decision on a complex ecosystem, for example, an agency may use the
known effects of the decision on one component of that ecosystem as a surrogate
for the effects of the decision on the ecosystem as a whole. These techniques allow
agency decision makers, by simulating reality, to organize available information
and plug holes created by unavailable information to reach what appears to be a
rational and objective conclusion about the environmental effects of the action
being contemplated. The use of simulation modeling and surrogates in this fashion
thus enables agencies to conform to their statutory responsibilities to base decisions
on scientific considerations, even though a complete understanding of the
relationships between the actions they are proposing to take, or authorize others to
take, and the resulting environmental effects, may be beyond their current
capabilities or impossible ever fully to ascertain.
The reliance by pollution control and natural resource management agencies on
scientific models or on surrogate parameters to make decisions under federal
environmental legislation has generated significant controversy, despite its utility in
addressing the paradox created by statutory mandates to make decisions based on
"[elven people aware of the problem of shrinking biodiversity are likely to be surprised by
how much scientific uncertainty there is in species conservation policy"). See generally
James Wilson, Scientific Uncertainty, Complex Systems, and the Design of Common-Pool
Institutions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 327, 335-47 (Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz,
Nives Dolgak, Paul C. Stem, Susan Stonich & Elke U. Weber eds., 2002).
5. Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in Natural
Resource Regulation, 26 PuB. LAND & REsouRcEs L. REv. 1, 3 (2005).
6. A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 141 (2002).
7. James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between
Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 909
(2005).
8. See STEPHEN BOCKING, NATURE'S EXPERTS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 27 (2004).
9. Id. at 26.
10. Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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unavailable information. Scientific models are built upon assumptions, which are
often based on value judgments and therefore tend to be contested. Even if
agreement exists on the assumptions upon which a model is based, there may be
disagreements about the applicability of the model to a particular problem or
situation. Moreover, competing models or differential applications of a single
model may yield starkly divergent predictions about the effects of an agency's
decision on the environment. As a result, litigation concerning the use of simulation
models and surrogate parameters by environmental and resource management
agencies has been plentiful.
This Article considers the lessons that may be drawn from the recent
controversy created by one federal agency's shifting approach to the use of models
and surrogates. The National Forest Management Act (NFMA)" delegates to the
National Forest Service ("Forest Service") the responsibility to develop land and
resource management plans (LRMPs) for units of the National Forest System
(NFS) 12 and to make site-specific decisions about the use of those units in a manner
consistent with the plans. 13 The NFMA charges the Forest Service with the task of
issuing regulations governing the land use planning process that, among other
things, "provide[s] for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the
suitability and capability of the specific land area."14 The Service has encountered
difficulty in carrying out its responsibility to issue and apply those regulations
because of the enormous complexity of the ecosystems within the forests under its
jurisdiction. To minimize the uncertainty it faces in predicting what impact a
particular proposed action, such as a timber sale, will have on the diversity of plant
and animal species in the affected forest, the Forest Service has turned to the use of
models and surrogates. For years, acting under land use planning regulations issued
by the agency in 1982, it identified management indicator species (MIS) that it
determined were representative of the health of the ecosystem as a whole. The MIS
were supposed to act as surrogates for the impact of activities such as timber sales
on plant and animal diversity. The agency's aim was to predict the effects of
management actions on the selected MIS and to monitor the fate of the MIS after
the action was taken to determine whether the action was interfering with diversity.
If it was, suitable changes in management approaches could then be made. 15
The process of monitoring the effect of management actions such as timber sales
on MIS, however, turned out to be a burdensome one, requiring the Forest Service
to count MIS populations. The Forest Service began using the health of the habitat
of the MIS as a surrogate for the health of the MIS themselves. Thus, the MIS
habitat served as a surrogate, or proxy, for the health of the MIS, which in turn
served as a surrogate for the diversity of plant and animal communities in the
ecosystem as a whole. When litigants challenged this "proxy-on-proxy" approach
to compliance with the Forest Service's requirement to provide for diversity in the
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2000).
12. Id. § 1604(a).
13. Id. § 1604(i).
14. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
15. See infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
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planning process, the courts were unable to agree on whether this approach is
consistent with the NFMA. 1
6
In 2000, the Clinton Administration amended the NFMA planning regulations,
but the Bush Administration quickly replaced those regulations with its own
approach to planning. The Forest Service's 2005 regulations completely scrapped
the agency's obligation to track the impact of management actions on MIS, based
on the agency's conclusion that the MIS approach had been unreliable and flawed.
In its place, the regulations require that the Forest Service ensure the maintenance
of biological diversity by taking into account the "best available science" and by
focusing in most cases on the effect of management actions on diversity at the
ecosystem, rather than the species, level.17 The fate of the agency's latest approach
to dealing with scientific uncertainty in fulfilling the NFMA's diversity mandate is
not yet clear. A federal district court enjoined implementation of the 2005
regulations due to the Forest Service's noncompliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)18and the Endangered Species Act (ESA),' 9 but
it did not address the legality of the regulations under the NFMA.2 °
This Article explores the Forest Service's implementation of the NFMA's
diversity mandate to illustrate the benefits and disadvantages of using scientific
models and surrogate techniques that allow agencies to fulfill their mandates to
make science-based decisions in the face of incomplete information and scientific
uncertainty. Part I explores the paradox created when statutes require agencies to
protect environmental resources by basing their decisions on science, despite
limited knowledge of the manner in which the kinds of activities subject to the
agency's jurisdiction have affected those resources in the past or will affect them in
the future. It also describes the utility of modeling and surrogates as techniques for
resolving the paradox, and how the federal courts have reacted to challenges to
reliance on these analytical techniques. Part II analyzes the use of models and
surrogates in the specific context of the Forest Service's efforts to comply with the
NFMA's requirement to protect the diversity of plant and animal species in the land
use planning process that governs use of the national forests. Part III provides a list
of criteria by which modeling and similar simulation techniques should be judged
and assesses how the Forest Service's efforts to implement the diversity
requirement fare using those criteria as standards. The criteria include recognition
of the limits of scientific knowledge, collaboration, transparency, flexibility, and
accountability.
I. BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND THE USE OF MODELING AND SURROGATES TO
BRIDGE DATA GAPS
Because scientific uncertainty is such a pervasive feature of the analysis and
resolution of environmental problems, administrative agencies responsible for
16. See infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 204-59 and accompanying text.
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
19. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
20. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
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protecting human health and the environment, or for managing natural resources
such as those contained on the lands owned by the federal government, often must
make decisions without access to what would appear to be crucial information.
21
The situation facing these agencies involves what may be called "bounded
rationality"; the decision maker's effort to understand the implications of its actions
is bounded by constraints on its ability to gather or analyze information. Yet the
statutes under which these agencies operate typically require that their decisions be
the product of scientific analysis.
At times, Congress has recognized the uncertain milieu in which an agency's
decision-making process is steeped by allowing the agency to make its decisions
based on the "best available science," usually without defining, however, what
constitutes the best available scientific information or how the agency is supposed
to go about accumulating or assessing it. Agencies have developed different
methods for enabling them to make decisions with potential effects on the
environment despite missing or incompletely understood information. Among these
important techniques is the use of models or surrogates that produce simulations of
the real world based on limited information. This Part discusses the problem of
bounded rationality, how it affects the statutory obligations of agencies to factor
science into their determinations, and both the benefits and limits of modeling and
the use of surrogates as techniques for dealing with bounded rationality.
A. Bounded Rationality, Science, and Value Judgments in Environmental and
Natural Resource Management Laws
The need to make decisions in the absence of complete information is not
unique to the federal agencies responsible for protecting human health and the
environment or for managing the federal lands and the resources they contain. The
behavioral school of economics posited during the 1950s that various kinds of
institutional decision making are subject to what advocates of that school referred
,22to as "bounded rationality." The essential insight of the behavioral economists
was that decision-making in any institution is "bounded" by time, resources,
and cognitive constraints that make it virtually impossible to verify that the
solution chosen is optimal. In other words, an effort to find the "best" solution
to a problem will be hindered by time and cost constraints that limit the search
for alternative solutions and information for measuring which solution is better.
In addition, individuals are subject to significant cognitive limitations that
21. The scientific uncertainty that surrounds many environmental problems is multi-
faceted. In some cases, scientific uncertainty exists because research that is currently
feasible has not yet been conducted. In others, it may exist because ethical prohibitions,
resource constraints, or limits on available experimentation methods make it impossible to
generate the information that would reduce the uncertainty. See Wendy E. Wagner,
Congress, Science, and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 181, 190-91 (1999).
22. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23 (2003).
20081
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
restrict their ability to make the judgments necessary to pick an optimal
solution.23
If the desire to reach the optimal decision were not to be crippled by the
presence of bounded rationality, the decision maker would have to find a solution
to the problem at hand that was "good enough," such as by basing the solution on
the known factors that the decision maker regards as most relevant and important.
As a result, the best that organizations facing bounded rationality can do is to rely
on "'rules of thumb' or 'heuristics,' that take into account real-world limitations." 24
Although this kind of decision making is not based on "comprehensive rationality,"
it is nevertheless rational because it seeks to advance the organization's goals
despite the existence of limited knowledge and uncertainty.
Environmental agencies often engage in the kind of decision-making techniques
described by the behavioral economists. They do so, as Carol Rose has explained,
because policy-making bodies such as legislatures and administrative agencies,
unlike scientists, "have to make up their minds on the basis of very incomplete
information. ... Doing nothing is a decision too, and-like doing the wrong
thing-it can be a decision that makes environmental problems much worse.,
25
Reliance on rules of thumb, heuristics, or other techniques for facilitating
decision making in the face of scientific uncertainty necessarily requires that the
agencies employing those techniques move beyond science as the sole basis for
26decision making. An agency that relies on heuristics to make decisions based on
limited information generally seeks to extrapolate the available information to a
different context. Suppose for example, that an agency that has conducted tests in
which animals were exposed to toxic chemicals at high doses wants to determine
the likely effects of exposing humans to those same chemicals at much lower
doses. If the agency has no data points in the low-dose region at which humans are
likely to be exposed, it must extrapolate the test data in the high-dose region of the
dose-response curve to the low-dose region for which information is lacking. If an
agency responsible for protecting the vitality of an ecosystem decides that it is
impractical to accumulate the information needed to assess the impact of a
management action on the entire ecosystem, it may decide to focus on the status of
one resource as a proxy for the status of the ecosystem as a whole.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Rose, supra note 1, at 290.
26. As Wendy Wagner has explained:
"Science" has been conveniently, albeit roughly, defined by the Supreme Court
as that knowledge "derived by [or grounded in] the scientific method."
Information is generally not scientific knowledge... unless it can be supported
by a "scientifically valid" "reasoning or methodology." In most cases this
requires the ability to test a hypothesis in a replicable way or to use methods
that scientists have generally accepted as valid. When an experiment or
observation cannot realistically be conducted (or replicated) to answer a
hypothesis or question, the question leaves the province of science and must be
resolved in some other way.
Wagner, supra note 21, at 188.
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Those kinds of extrapolations, however, are no longer exclusively scientific
determinations. Instead, they depend on value judgments inherent in the selection
of the methods by which the extrapolation from known to missing information will
be made, as there may be multiple possible methods, all of which fit the known
facts equally well.27
Thus, as Wendy Wagner has explained, "not only must policymakers gather
available positive knowledge, but they also must appreciate where this information
leaves off and the various, scattered uncertainties begin. In fact, determining the
nature and importance of these various knowledge gaps is an unusually esoteric
inquiry" that involves a mix of science and policy issues.28 Moreover, although
some questions are posed in terms that may appear to be entirely scientific-such
as whether a given level of exposure to a pollutant is safe, or whether a proposed
activity will "jeopardize" an endangered species-their resolution inevitably
requires the decision maker to make policy judgments, regardless of the breadth of
scientific information available.
29
Thus, in many situations in which Congress has required agencies to justify their
decisions on "scientific" grounds, the existence of scientific uncertainty prevents
the agency from restricting the factors it considers to those that are exclusively
scientific. Although an agency's consideration of available scientific knowledge in
these contexts may help to "legitimize" its decisions, the agency cannot avoid the
need to make value judgments and policy determinations in reaching its ultimate
conclusion about whether to permit a certain activity with potential adverse effects
on the environment to proceed and, if so, to what extent.
30
27. See id. at 189; Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2256
(2002) ("'Because the shape of the dose-response curve in the low-dose region cannot be
verified by measurement, there is no means to determine which shape is correct .... [Wlhen
modeling the risks associated with lower doses, the dose/risk range in which regulatory
agencies and risk assessors are most frequently interested, there is a wide divergence in the
risk projected by [different models, all of which fit existing evidence.] ... In fact ... the
risks predicted by these ... models produce a 70,000-fold variation in the predicted
response."' (quoting PHILLIP L. WILLIAMS, ROBERT C. JAMES & STEPHEN M. ROBERTS,
PRINCIPLES OF TOXICOLOGY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS 456 (2d ed.
2000))); ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, DAVID L. MARKELL, WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, DANIEL R.
MANDELKER & A. DAN TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 723 (5th
ed. 2007) (displaying results of alternative extrapolation models for the same data points on
dose-response curve for tests to assess carcinogenicity of chemical in mice).
"[U]nderstanding the strengths and weaknesses of any particular model is essential to
understanding the relevance of specific target organ toxicities to what would be expected in
humans." Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns
of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 33 (2001).
28. Wagner, supra note 21, at 193.
29. In deciding whether a given level of exposure to pollution is safe, for example, an
agency may have to decide whether it is "safe" for humans to experience an excess risk of
contracting cancer of one in a million or one in 100,000. The agency will have to make that
policy determination even if it has epidemiological data upon which it may make an accurate
assessment of the risk of exposure.
30. Tarlock, supra note 6, at 142-43; see also RICHARD J. LAZARuS, THE MAKING OF
2008]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
B. Accommodating Bounded Rationality in Environmental Policy Decisions
Faced with the impossibility of eliminating scientific uncertainty, both Congress
and the federal agencies responsible for protecting the environment and preserving
the nation's natural resource base have taken steps to accommodate bounded
rationality, while retaining a science-based focus for addressing environmental
problems. Some of the federal environmental laws require that agencies base their
decisions on the "best available science," thereby recognizing that complete
information may never be available. In such situations, the statutes charge the
agencies with doing the best they can to mine the information that it is practical to
obtain before discharging their statutory responsibilities. Some agencies, including
the Forest Service, have interpreted statutory provisions requiring that decisions be
based on science as permitting decision making based on the best available science.
Agencies also have frequently accommodated bounded rationality by resorting
to simulation techniques such as modeling and the use of surrogates. Reliance on
modeling or surrogates allows the decision maker relying on these techniques to
extrapolate from known information to realms of uncertainty, thereby plugging data
gaps that otherwise might have prevented the decision maker from justifying its
decisions in scientific terms.
The remainder of this Part describes these techniques for accommodating
bounded rationality. Part II analyzes the efforts of the Forest Service to use best
available science mandates, modeling, and surrogates to carry out its responsibility
under the NFMA to protect plant and animal diversity in the national forests.
1. "Best Available Science" Mandates
Provisions requiring that federal environmental and natural resource
management agencies base their decisions on consideration of the "best available
science" are common. Perhaps the best known of these is the provision of the ESA
requiring the Interior and Commerce Departments to base their decisions on
whether or not to list a species as endangered or threatened "solely on the basis of
the best scientific and commercial data available." 31 But Congress has used the
same or similar language in a variety of other pollution control and natural resource
management statutes.
32
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 224 (2004) (asserting that "[s]cience will not supply the fixed
standard for what constitutes the appropriate level of ecosystem protection for simple
application by environmental lawmakers"); DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR
ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON: How CONGRESS GRABS POWER, SHIRKS RESPONSIBILITY,
AND SHORTCHANGES THE PEOPLE 69 (2005) (contending that the "finely calibrated
techniques" of science "provide no right answer to many questions of the greatest
[environmental] policy consequence").
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(I)(A) (2000).
32. See Michael J. Brennan, David E. Roth, Murray D. Feldman & Andrew Robert
Greene, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of the "Best Scientific Data Available "
Standard in the Endangered Species Act, 16 TuL. ENvTL. L.J. 387, 402-03 (2003) (citing
various federal and state laws, including the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, and the Magnuson-Stevens Act); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under
the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U.
[Vol. 83:465
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Although Congress has never defined the term "best available science" in any of
the environmental statutes in which that term is used,33 it has explicitly recognized
that, in directing that agencies make decisions on that basis, the optimal amount of
scientific evidence for making the decision involved may not be available. 34 As
Holly Doremus has explained, a "best available science" mandate may serve
multiple purposes. These include ensuring that an agency's decisions accurately
reflect known scientific information, imposing a mandate on the agency to make its
best efforts to ferret out available information, 35 placing an imprimatur of
objectivity on agency decisions to increase public trust and enhance the agency's
credibility,36 and creating a basis for resolving judicial challenges to agency
decisions. 37 Ultimately, it is possible for the adoption of a statutory or regulatory
L.Q. 1029, 1033-34 (1997) (listing natural resource management statutes that use variants of
the "best available science" terminology); A.W. Harris, The Best Scientific Evidence
Available: The Whaling Moratorium and Divergent Interpretations of Science, 29 WM. &
MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 375 (2005) (discussing efforts by the International Whaling
Commission to limit whaling).
33. Doremus, supra note 32, at 1033-34; see also Brennan et al, supra note 32, at 390
(stating that, although Congress placed a "near-talismanic reliance" on the use of the best
available science in the ESA, it "failed to provide guidance on how to determine whether
particular data meets this standard").
34. Doremus, supra note 32, at 1075.
35. "[T]he ESA's best available science mandate might impose . . . an affirmative
obligation to find data, rather than to simply evaluate what others present. A few courts have
interpreted the [ESA's] best available science mandate to impose precisely such an
obligation," although some have refused to do so. Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects,
and Future of the Endangered Species Act's Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L.
397, 424 (2004). Compliance with a mandate to engage in the agency's best efforts could
involve a change in the ways in which the agency accumulates or interprets scientific
information, such as engaging in peer review before determining whether to credit a
particular piece of evidence. Id. at 432-33.
36. Professor Doremus has explained:
When they first developed the best available science mandate, legislators and
regulators alike might well have believed that it would increase public
acceptance of ESA decisions. People are more likely to accept outcomes that
prove unfavorable to their interests when they trust the motives of the actor.
The apparent objectivity of science seems ideally suited to enhancing trust. It is
no surprise, therefore, that politicians have often cloaked decisions made on
other grounds in the garb of science.
Id. at 426-27. In addition, Professor Doremus speculates that a "best available science"
mandate may have the effect, if not the purpose, of shifting decision-making authority within
the agency from political appointees to scientists, many of whom are likely to be career
employees. Id. at 435. If such a shift were to occur, it might actually result in a decision-
making process that relies more heavily on objective assessments of scientific evidence and
less on raw political determinations.
37. A "best available science" mandate might prompt more deferential substantive
review if the courts are inclined to defer to an agency's scientific and technical
determinations. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (enunciating deferential standard of judicial review of agency technical
determinations). On the other hand, a "best available science" mandate may provide a basis
for a court to scrutinize the agency's explanation to determine whether it has adequate
support in the record. See Doremus, supra note 35, at 430; Brennan et al., supra note 32, at
20081
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
mandate that an agency base its decisions solely on the "best available science" to
make it harder for environmental agencies to weaken environmental and natural
resource protection mechanisms by relying on political opposition or on factors,
such as economic considerations, that tend to cut against stringent pollution control
requirements or meaningful constraints on natural resource development.
38
2. Modeling and Reliance on Surrogates
The environmental and natural resource management agencies have sought to
accommodate bounded rationality in two other, related ways. First, agencies have
created models that enable them to predict the impacts of their decisions on the
environment by simulating real world conditions. Second, they have focused their
analysis on a small component of a particular human-nature interaction and used it
as a surrogate for the larger problem to which they are responding or which they
are attempting to manage. The two mechanisms for accommodating bounded
rationality are interrelated because one of the primary challenges for modelers is to
"find reliable surrogate variables to permit the [agency] to 'scale up' the more
finely scaled measurements researchers typically collect." 39 Simulation techniques
can facilitate decision making in the face of scientific uncertainty by allowing
agencies to extrapolate from observed data to situations in which apparently crucial
information is missing. Modeling exercises cannot eliminate uncertainty, however,
and they create a risk that those conducting the modeling exercise can mask value
judgments behind a fagade of technical objectivity.
412 (stating that "many courts applying the best scientific data available standard under the
ESA have imposed an affirmative obligation on the agency to explain why, when faced with
two contradictory scientific conclusions, it chooses one over the other").
38. Professor Doremus has stated:
[Tihe best available science mandate may be playing a vital role in stiffening
agencies' conservation backbones. It prevents the agencies from openly making
decisions based on the costs of conservation or expected political opposition.
Undoubtedly, expected economic and political costs still figure in, but they
cannot be openly acknowledged as the basis for a decision. Decisions must be
scientifically defensible, even if other unacknowledged factors contribute to
them. The mere suggestion that a decision expressly considered political or
economic factors can make judicial reversal more likely.
Doremus, supra note 35, at 435-36; see also Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 5, at 22
(arguing that the ESA's "best available science" mandate amounts to "a finger on the scale,
of some indeterminate size, on the side of the species").
39. Fred L. Bunnell & Mark Boyland, Decision-Support Systems: It's the Question Not
the Model, 10 J. FOR NATURE CONSERVATION 269, 274 (2003). Bunnell and Boyland add:
The advantages gained in assisting management emphasize the importance of
developing reliable, interim surrogate variables for those portions of the real
world amenable for aggregation. When we make decisions we incorporate only
a few variables effectively. Again it is apparent that the largest benefit gained
from the system is in thinking through the questions, variables, and choices
carefully.
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a. The Ubiquity of Modeling in Environmental Policy Making
Modeling and other simulation techniques have become important components
of policy making in many fields, including environmental law.40 Modeling is an
integral part of the process of the implementation of pollution control statutes. The
federal Clean Air Act (CAA) is perhaps the best example of the wide variety of
uses to which modeling may be put in efforts by federal and state agencies to
minimize risks to public health and the environment resulting from pollution.4'
Both the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and state agencies
have relied on modeling to designate air quality control regions under the program
for achieving the national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). 42 EPA has used
models to establish emission limitations for individual sources of air pollution in
crafting nationally uniform emission standards for stationary sources 43 and state
pollution control agencies have done so in developing state implementation plans
(SIPs) for achieving the NAAQS. 44 Indeed, the CAA requires that certain
demonstrations that a SIP will provide for attainment of the NAAQS be based on
photochemical grid modeling or similar analytical techniques approved by EPA.45
The agencies have relied on models to decide whether to issue permits specifying
40. See, e.g., Antje Kann & John P. Weyant, Approaches for Performing Uncertainty
Analysis in Large-Scale Energy/Economic Policy Models, 5 ENVTL. MODELING &
AssESsMENT 29, 29 (1999) (asserting that, "[w]ith rapid advances in computing power over
the last decade, large-scale models have become essential to decision making in public
policy").
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
42. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding,
however, that modeling exercise was based on erroneous data). See generally Bruce M.
Kramer, Air Quality Modeling: Judicial, Legislative and Administrative Reactions, 5
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 236 (1979).
43. See, e.g., Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding
new source performance standards based on extrapolation of one industry's performance to
another industry); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(k)(3)(D) (authorizing the use of modeling in the
development of a national strategy for controlling emission of hazardous air pollutants in
urban areas).
44. See, e.g., BCCA Appeal Group v. EPA, 355 F.3d 817 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding
EPA's reliance on photochemical grid model in approving Texas's demonstration that
Houston's SIP would achieve attainment of ozone NAAQS, despite the model's inability to
replicate the city's unique meteorological conditions); Pan Am. Grain Mfg. Co. v. EPA, 95
F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1996); Ohio v. EPA, 784 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Cincinnati Gas & Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572
F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1978); see also Michael S. McMahon & Steven D. Hinkle, Note, State of
Ohio v. EPA: Does the Sixth Circuit Have a New Standard for Its Review of the EPA's Use
ofAir Quality Modeling?, 18 U. TOL. L. REv. 569 (1987).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(A). In Environmental Defense v. EPA, 369 F.3d 193 (2d
Cir. 2004), the court interpreted the statute as requiring only that grid modeling form the
"foundation and principal component of the attainment demonstration." Id. at 205; see also
Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (construing § 751 la(c)(2)(A) as allowing
the EPA to adjust results of photochemical grid modeling to assure consistency with real-
world observations as a means of demonstrating attainment of ozone NAAQS).
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emission limitations and to establish the limitations set forth in those permits.46
Models also have been used to assist in the implementation of emissions trading
programs.
47
Modeling is also potentially useful in protecting other resources from the
adverse effects of pollution. Modeling can provide a basis for predicting the impact
of oil spills and hazardous substance releases on groundwater quality.48 Models are
used in conducting risk assessments to determine the potential carcinogenicity of
tested chemical substances to extrapolate the dose-response data obtained in high-
dose animal tests to the levels of likely human exposure, for which there are no
data or insufficient data.49
The federal agencies responsible for managing publicly owned lands and
resources also commonly engage in modeling exercises. The Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA) explicitly authorizes modeling to assess water quality in
46. See, e.g., Sur Contra La Contaminacion v. EPA, 202 F.3d 443 (1st Cir. 2000); N.
Plains Res. Council v. EPA, 645 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally James A.
Westbrook, Air Dispersion Modeling: Tools to Assess Impacts from Pollution Sources, 13
NAT. RES. & ENV'T 546 (1999).
47. See generally Camille V. Otero-Phillips, What's in the Forecast? A Look at the
EPA 's Use of Computer Models in Emissions Trading, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
187 (1998).
48. See generally Michael Sklash, Matthew Schroeder & James Dragun, Groundwater
Models: Can You Believe What They Are Saying?, 13 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 542 (1999).
49. See, e.g., John S. Applegate & Celia Campbell-Mohn, Risk Assessment: Science,
Law and Policy, 14 NAT. RES. & ENV'T 219, 220 (2000) (explaining that epidemiologists
"must rely on animal testing to estimate the likelihood that cancer will be induced at a given
level of exposure" and that "[t]o predict the dose response in humans at low levels of
exposure over long periods of time, risk assessors must use theoretical models because direct
observation is impossible"); Thomas R. Head, IH, PCBs-The Rise and Fall of an Industrial
Miracle, 19 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 15, 18 (2005); Vein R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a
"Neutral Arbiter "for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 197, 209-10
(2003) (stating that "[t]oxicologists and exposure modelers often use linear regression
models to characterize the incremental contributions of multiple hazards (e.g., asbestos
exposure and cigarette smoking) to the total risk of an adverse effect (e.g., lung cancer)" and
that "scientists use a variety of mathematical models to characterize the quantitative
relationships among multiple variables"); Peter C. Wright, Thomas F. Long & Lesa L.
Aylward, Twenty-Five Years of Dioxin Cancer Risk Assessment, 19 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 31,
34 (2005) (explaining that "EPA has for many years employed the multistage dose-
extrapolation model, which generally predicts the highest cancer risk of all the most
commonly used models and then increases the prediction of risk by estimating the statistical
upper bound on the best estimate of the multistage model at low doses"); Michael Schon,
Comment, Susceptible Children: Why the EPA 's New Risk Assessment Guidelines for
Children Fail to Protect America's Future, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 701, 704 (2004) (stating that
"risk assessment creates an equation that allows regulators to predict what the probable risk
of cancer would be when people are exposed to a chemical at a particular level or
concentration," that "[iun formulating this equation, . . . the EPA makes assumptions and
develops mathematical models to fill in gaps (or 'uncertainties') caused from lack of
scientific knowledge," and that risk assessment therefore "blends scientific knowledge with
probabilistic assumptions").
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coastal waters and the Great Lakes. 50 The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) uses
modeling to assist in listing and delisting decisions, 51 in designating critical
habitats, 52 and in allowing incidental takings under the ESA and the Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).53 Land management agencies such as the
National Park Service (NPS) also rely on modeling exercises to assist in the
development of standards to guide decisions on which uses to permit or prohibit.5
4
These agencies, among others, also use modeling in the preparation of
environmental assessments and environmental impact statements under NEPA. 55
b. The Benefits of Modeling
A model has been defined as "a tool used to simulate some aspect of the real
world" 56 or as "a simplified representation of some aspect of the real world" that
allows its user to accomplish a "purposeful reduction of a mass of information to a
manageable size and shape. 57 Some models or other proxies for reality seek to
extrapolate data from small-scale phenomena (such as the effects of a timber
harvest on a single animal species) to predict the effects on a larger whole (such as
50. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451(g)(2)(B) (2000) (requiring evaluation of "research programs on
the causes, characteristics, and impacts of hypoxia, including recommendations of how to
eliminate significant gaps in hypoxia modeling and monitoring data").
51. See, e.g., Removing the Yellowstone Distinct Population Segment of Grizzly Bears
from the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 70 Fed. Reg. 69,854, 69,859
(Nov. 17, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
52. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical
Habitat for the Bull Trout, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,212, 56,237 (Sept. 26, 2005) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17).
53. See, e.g., Marine Mammals; Incidental Take During Specified Activities, 68 Fed.
Reg. 66,744, 66,745 (Nov. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 18) (discussing model
that simulated the effects of oil spills on estimated polar bear survival in the Beaufort Sea).
54. See, e.g., Clarification of the Term the day in the Definition of Substantial
Restoration of Natural Quiet for Grand Canyon NP, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,129, 63,130 (Nov. 7,
2003) (discussing computer modeling for analyzing effects of aircraft operations on noise
levels within the Grand Canyon).
55. See, e.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1140 (10th Cir. 2007)
(describing the Forest Service's use of two computer models to calculate the amount of
expected runoff resulting from timber sale project and the effect on stream channels); Lands
Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2005) (challenging the Forest Service's
use of the Water and Sediment Yields (WATSED) model for assessing cumulative effects of
timber harvest projects on in-stream sedimentation); Basin Creek Fuels Reduction Project,
Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, Silver Bow, County, MT, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,906,
17,906 (Apr. 14, 2003) (discussing use of fire simulation models to determine where fuel
treatments would be the most effective in slowing fire while minimizing the number of acres
needing to be treated); Phase II Amendment of Black Hills National Forest Land and
Resource Management Plan, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,406, 59,406 (Nov. 28, 2001) (referring to
recalculation of allowable timber sale quantity and other forest outputs based on Forest
Vegetation Simulator (FVS), Habitat Capability (HABCAP), and spatial analysis models).
56. Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 903 n. 1.




an ecosystem in which the single species lives). Others use observations on a
relatively large scale (such as the observed effects of exposing laboratory animals
to maximum tolerated doses of toxic chemicals) to predict the effects of smaller-
scale activity (such as the effects of low-level human exposure to those
chemicals).58 Models serve as "decision support systems" that both simplify the
physical reality being analyzed and translate observed results into predictions that
would not be available simply by observing that reality.59 Models can increase the
analyst's understanding of the relationships at issue (e.g., between a timber sale and
its impact on biological diversity) by combining or presenting data in a way that
provides new insights or extends those relationships beyond the range of observed
measurement. If the predictions provided by a model turn out to conform to
subsequently observed real world developments, the modelers gain confidence in
the accuracy of the assumptions upon which the model is based concerning the
relationships between human activities and environmental effects.
60
Models are particularly well suited to large-scale planning efforts. Because they
are capable of "represent[ing] mathematically complex chemical, physical and
social relationships," they allow planners "to make predictions and test assumptions
in ways that otherwise would not be possible. Not surprisingly, models have
become essential and ubiquitous planning tools, our dependence upon them making
their abandonment all but unthinkable.",61 Two observers described the
attractiveness of modeling to planners in the following terms:
Policymakers often must predict outcomes of complicated processes, and
making those predictions would be all but impossible without models. Complex
environmental systems often involve more variables, data, and interdependent
feedback processes than people reasonably can organize in their minds, and
interactions within these systems may create counterintuitive, nonlinear
responses that are impossible to understand without models. Models can
organize, manipulate, and process vast quantities of data and can simulate
complex multivariable processes, and these capacities allow them to predict the
future, compare alternative possible futures, test the ramifications of
assumptions, and contribute to improved understanding of system interactions.
These powers are invaluable in planning efforts.6 2
58. See Rose, supra note 1, at 291 (asserting that policy makers extrapolate both from
large to small and vice versa, but that "the large-to-small extrapolation ... is especially
common in environmental policy"); GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 722-24 (discussing
the validity of conducting animal tests for carcinogenesis at maximum tolerated doses).
59. Bunnell & Boyland, supra note 39, at 270; see also Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at
912 ("[M]odels allow scientific knowledge to be codified and standardized.").
60. Bunnell & Boyland, supra note 39, at 272-73.
61. Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 904.
62. Id. at 912-13. See also Hanna J. Cortner & Dennis L. Schweitzer, Institutional
Limits and Legal Implications of Quantitative Models in Forest Planning, 13 ENVTL. L. 493,
497 (1983) (arguing that "[q]uantitative analytical procedures are necessary to utilize fully
data describing complex situations. Computers make the use of sophisticated mathematical
models possible. They provide the mechanism to organize and manipulate data, to formulate
and project management alternatives into the future, and to assess physical and
socioeconomic implications.").
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Moreover, modeling is an efficient analytical technique because it reduces the time
and expense needed to gather information, even when acquiring the relevant data
through real-world experiments and observation rather through simulation
exercises is both possible and ethically appropriate.
63
c. The Limits of Modeling
Modeling and other simulation techniques (such as the use of surrogate variables
to represent more complicated relationships between human activities and the
resulting environmental effects) allow environmental and natural resource
management agencies to make decisions, despite the presence of scientific
uncertainty about some aspects of those relationships. They allow agencies whose
statutory mandates compel decisions based on science to make decisions even
when significant scientific information does not yet exist, or at least when that
information is not currently available to the agency. Models do not eliminate
uncertainty, however, and may even exacerbate it if the models provide a distorted
representation of the real world. Nor, despite their fagade of objectivity, do models
eliminate the subjective component of environmental decision making or prevent
agencies from making value judgments. Finally, the technical nature of modeling
exercises may shield the agency's assumptions and value judgments from public
scrutiny, thereby precluding meaningful public participation in agency decision-
making processes.
Models allow decision makers to simulate reality in situations in which direct
observations of the phenomenon being analyzed are either impossible or
impractical. 64 Models, however, are only "placeholders for reality. 63 They are
capable neither of providing a completely accurate representation of reality nor of
eliminating the scientific uncertainty that induces the decision maker to resort to
modeling in the first place. 66 Errors in the design and application of models are
63. See Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 913. Fine and Owen state that:
Policymakers rarely can perform real-world experiments; large-scale
experiments upon the environment are generally prohibitively time-consuming
and expensive, and the threat of human injury or irreparable environmental
harm makes some experimentation ethically suspect at best. Models avoid these
problems by performing their tasks in controlled settings, without
experimentation upon the actual environment. [Although] [g]athering model
input data can require extensive effort-indeed, data gathering is often the most
expensive and time-consuming task in a modeling study... the financial costs
of modeling, while often quite large in actual dollar terms, can pale in
comparison to the costs of other planning methods.
Id.
64. Cf Sklash et al., supra note 48, at 542 (defining a model as "any simulation of a real
thing").
65. Thomas 0. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of
Environmental Modeling, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,751, 10,763 (2003).
66. See Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 922 ("[N]o model can incorporate all real data or
simulate all of the processes that might influence an outcome. Because every model is
necessarily an approximation of reality, models' predictions unavoidably contain some
error."). Uncertainty in models takes two forms: "parametric uncertainty, which arises due to
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common, but may not be easy to discover. The inability of models to provide
perfect replications of reality becomes a problem if the administrative agencies
using the models to make decisions fail either to recognize or acknowledge these
imperfections. If they fail to recognize them, they may continue to rely on models
that provide flawed output. The result may be that the agency makes decisions that
conflict with governing statutory criteria or with the agency's own stated goals.
67
The limitations on data that initially prompted resort to the models may hinder the
modelers' ability to assess whether the models are working in the intended
manner. 68 If an agency using simulation techniques is aware of modeling flaws but
fails to disclose them, not only may the decisions based on the model deviate from
statutory norms, but affected entities and the public at large may have difficulty
discovering the deviation.
Models not only fail to provide complete representations of objective reality. By
their very nature, they are also incapable of providing analysis that is entirely
objective, although they may be perceived in that manner.69 Models are built upon
assumptions, and those assumptions inevitably reflect value judgments. These
value judgments can affect the selection of a model from among several
alternatives, the design of the model, and the manner in which modeling results are
interpreted and communicated. If toxicologists use models to provide estimates of
the risk of getting cancer as a result of long-term, low-level exposure to cancer-
causing substances, for example, they may assume that there is no safe level of
exposure in the absence of data to the contrary. Alternatively, they may take the
position that the absence of data demonstrating a risk at low levels of exposure
should be interpreted as evidence that a safe threshold level of exposure exists at
the lowest point on the dose-response curve at which known adverse effects have
occurred. The choice between these two competing assumptions requires the
analyst or policy maker to make a judgment call. The first assumption reflects a
decision to err on the side of safety, while the second may be based on a desire not
to restrict economically productive activity that creates potentially carcinogenic
exposures in the absence of a demonstrable threat to the public health. Similarly, a
model that seeks to compare the costs and benefits of implementing an
environmental protection measure will have to incorporate a discount rate to
imperfect knowledge," and "stochasticity, which is due to inherent variability in certain
processes." Kann & Weyant, supra note 40, at 30. Whereas the first kind of uncertainty
decreases over time as scientists accumulate additional factual knowledge, "stochastic
uncertainty is not reduced over time" because "natural variability will always occur." Id.
67. See, e.g., Falk Huettmann, Databases and Science-Based Management in the
Context of Wildlife and Habitat: Toward a Certified ISO Standard for Objective Decision-
Making for the Global Community by Using the Internet, 69 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 466, 466
(2005) (stating that "[d]ecisions based on soft foundations can harm wildlife and habitat and
threaten future survival").
68. See Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 924-25.
69. See Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 62, at 516 (contending that "[v]alue-laden
considerations permeate both the formulation of the model and the application of model
results" and that "[q]uantitative models are subject to the same qualitative and subjective
influences as the beyond-the-model portion of the decision process").
70. See Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 927-29.
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compute the number (and perhaps the value) of lives saved in the future and the
costs that will result from alternative levels of regulation.7'
The necessity of making value judgments in the design of models or other
simulation techniques is not problematic, as long as those judgments are disclosed
so the impacts of those judgments on the modeling results canbe assessed. As two
observers of the use of modeling by the Forest Service have put it:
Values are unavoidable. The use of quantitative planning models, specifying
ways of doing things in a reproducible manner and seeking to substitute
mathematical algorithms for intuitive judgments, appears to make the planning
process more rational and scientific. The danger is that the planning agency, the
courts, and the public may all lose sight of where and how these unavoidable
values enter quantitative models and the impact they have on the use of
analytical results.
72
Indeed, the value judgments reflected in quantitative models may be less
problematic than those built into nonquantitative scientific hypotheses based on
analogies or metaphors, provided the modeler discloses the algorithm upon which
the model is based. The underlying assumptions of a mathematical model may be
more easily examined, assessed for potential bias, and falsified than the less visible
assumptions and value judgments built into a non-mathematical model. One
criterion for determining whether an analytical technique qualifies as "scientific" is
whether the theories upon which it proceeds are falsifiable.73 To the extent that a
quantitative model lends itself more readily to falsification, its use fits more
comfortably within the framework of scientific analysis than an analogical model
whose underlying assumptions are hidden.
According to some who have analyzed science-based decision making by the
federal land management agencies, the use of modeling by those agencies is
71. See Kann & Weyant, supra note 40, at 29-30 (referring to policy choices about
protecting future generations involved in the selection of a discount rate, and stating that
different underlying assumptions, such as how to value a human life, can lead to widely
varying results among different models). See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law
and the Present Future, 87 GEO. L.J. 2025 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our
Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REv. 39 (1999).
72. Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 62, at 495-96. See also Doremus, supra note 1, at
334-35:
The obsessive search for objective bases for decisions also creates a temptation
to disguise non-objective decisions as scientific, a practice that skews the
political process and can interfere with our ability to achieve our real goals.
Where science or economics cannot provide the answers that policy decisions
require, seemingly objective criteria are more likely to hide than to overcome
the biases of decisionmakers, and are not likely to produce consistent or
predictable decisions.
73. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1992) ("[Tlhe
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability"
(quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECruRES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989))).
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susceptible to the criticism that the agencies, intentionally or not, have masked their
value judgments in the language of technical determinations. As a result,
outsiders are frequently unable to discover exactly what [the Forest Service
has] done or to determine if bias has crept into analysis. For example,
management activities thought to be undesirable might be eliminated from
consideration without explicit analysis, or constraints judged overly restrictive
relaxed to give the decision maker a greater range of discretion.74
Decisions by the Interior Department's FWS and the Commerce Department's
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Fisheries under the
ESA have provoked a similar charge:
Rather than achieving either value-neutral or politically invulnerable
decisionmaking, the strictly science mandate [of § 4 of the ESA] has
encouraged the listing agencies to devise an inscrutable listing policy hidden
behind a wall labeled science. The mandate has produced listing decisions
which are often incomprehensible even to informed observers, and nearly
inaccessible to the general public.75
d. Judicial Review of Model-Based Decision Making by Environmental and
Natural Resource Management Agencies
Litigants have challenged decisions by environmental agencies based on the use
of models, surrogates, or other simulation techniques. In some of these cases, the
challengers have asserted procedural errors in the agency's decision-making
process, while in others the litigants have claimed that the decisions were
substantively flawed.
In reviewing challenges to the use of agency models, the courts in
environmental cases have recognized the importance of disclosing and providing an
opportunity to comment upon the model's assumptions. 76 Summarizing the
relevant precedents, Professors McGarity and Wagner state that "the Agency must
provide clear notice of the possibility that it will rely upon a particular model and
provide sufficient information about that model to allow the public to comment
upon its use of the model in the rulemaking proceeding." 77 In one case, the D.C.
74. Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 62, at 503.
75. Doremus, supra note 32, at 1129.
76. In Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005), the court held that the
Forest Service violated NEPA by approving a timber harvest as part of a watershed
restoration project. In particular, the court found that the agency's "heavy reliance" on the
WATSED model to analyze the cumulative effects of timber harvests on in-stream
sedimentation violated NEPA. The court regarded the disclosure that the model's
consideration of relevant factors was incomplete to be inadequate. It added: "Moreover, the
Forest Service knew that WATSED had shortcomings, and yet did not disclose these
shortcomings until the agency's decision was challenged on the administrative appeal. We
hold that this withholding of information violated NEPA, which requires up-front disclosures
of relevant shortcomings in the data or models." Id. at 1032.
77. McGarity & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10755; see also Fine & Owen, supra note 7,
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Circuit rejected the claim that EPA failed to afford adequate notice of its intention
to rely on a model in deciding whether to list a substance as a hazardous air
pollutant under the CAA. 78 It found that EPA had explained the basis for the model
in the notice of proposed rulemaking, set forth its rationale for making various
assumptions, requested comments on those assumptions, addressed significant
comments in documents that accompanied the final rule, and made revisions in
modeling parameters based upon the comments it received.79 As long as the agency
follows these steps, the courts are unlikely to invalidate the agency's model-based
decision on the ground that it failed to provide proper notice of the model's role in
the decision-making process.
80
Substantive challenges to an agency's use of modeling in environmental
decision making typically face an uphill battle. The courts have been wary of
second-guessing the manner in which the environmental agencies have interpreted
and applied science. 8' They also have recognized that, in many environmental
decision-making contexts, the use of modeling is essential to the ability of the
agency to implement its statutory responsibilities. 82 As a result, judicial review of
at 911 (stating that "[t]he judiciary does acknowledge an obligation to carefully review the
procedural integrity of agency decision-making" that is based on the use of models).
78. Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
79. Id. at 1263.
80. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10756. Professors McGarity and Wagner
add:
[An EPA modeling exercise conducted in the context of notice-and-comment
rulemaking should not suffer reversal on notice grounds if the Agency is careful
to describe the model in some detail; identify the assumptions upon which the
model relies; explain why those assumptions are valid in the particular context
in which it is applying the model; and specifically request comments on the
validity of the assumptions and their use in the modeling exercise.
Id.
81. See Id. at 10757 ("The general rule for the courts' substantive review of technical
models under the informal rulemaking provisions of the APA is deference to the agency's
technical and policy choices as long as the agency explains its choices, especially the
controverted ones, in an accessible and complete way."); Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at
911-12 ("[R]espect for agencies' interpretations of science has . . . become deeply
institutionalized within the judiciary .... Deference to agency judgment is a core element of
judicial review of environmental decisions, and judicial opinions are filled with statements
about how agencies, not judges, hold technical expertise.").
82. See Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 915 (stating that, "[r]ealistically, computer
modeling is a useful and often essential tool for performing the Herculean labors Congress
imposed on EPA in the Clean Air Act" (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 332
(D.C. Cir. 1981))). One court assessed the utility of groundwater flow modeling as a
technique for helping to allocate the costs of responding to groundwater contamination
among multiple responsible parties as follows:
If properly used, computer models appear to be an invaluable tool in
approximating the complexities of underground fluid flow. Without these
models, the scientists and engineers would be limited to guessing at sources and
fluid flow characteristics based on the limited number of wells that penetrate
the aquifer. Through modeling, reservoir flow and contaminant transport can be
calculated using complex mathematical operations that simulate the aquifer
characteristics. From that effort, the model can simulate the progression of
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agency modeling decisions has tended to be very deferential.8 3 The courts typically
have not been impressed by claims that an agency chose the wrong model from
among competing alternative models,84 that deficiencies in the data the agency
plugged into the model invalidated the results, 85 that the model did not accurately
predict or was not capable of actually predicting real world results, 86 or that the
agency should have deferred its decision until it could accumulate more
information instead of relying on modeling results. 
87
A case that illustrates the judicial inclination toward deference to agency
modeling choices involved a Native American tribe's challenge to the Corps of
Engineers' decision to implement a flood control program in the Florida Everglades
that entailed the construction of structures such as pump stations and seepage
reservoirs. 8 The tribe focused on the Corps's failure to provide information to the
FWS based on computer modeling about the effect of the construction on
endangered birds before the latter issued its biological opinion on the program.
According to the tribe, this failure violated the ESA's mandate that agencies use
"the best scientific and commercial data available to ensure the protection" of listed
species.89 The court refused to find that the Corps violated the ESA, concluding
that it was appropriate to defer to the Corps's decision "to proceed with imperfect
contaminant plumes from each source, thereby providing an estimate of the size
of each plume at any given time. Unfortunately, there are no true crystal balls-
the models are only as good as the data placed into them. In this case, the data
inputs and methods for configuring the models provided fertile ground for
disagreement. Nonetheless, the court concludes that computer modeling of
plume size is an appropriate basis for allocating costs.
City of Wichita v. Trs. of Apco Oil Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1106-07 (D. Kan. 2003).
83. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 5, at 19 ("Scientific judgments are generally set
aside only in the most egregious situations, as when it is clear that there is a major
inconsistency between the underlying information and the ultimate conclusion.").
84. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d, 1150 (6th Cir. 1978).
85. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10765.
86. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Cincinnati
Gas & Elec. Co. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1978); Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, 384 F. Supp.
2d 203, 221 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oceana, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 179 Fed.
App'x 703 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that model used to assess impact of scallop fishing on
turtles bore a reasonable relationship to the reality it purported to represent, despite
uncertainties in its application). But cf Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251,
1268 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating, in the course of holding that EPA violated the Energy Policy
Act by choosing a 10,000-year compliance period for its radiation-exposure standards, "that
there is still considerable uncertainty as to whether current modeling capability allows
development of computer models that will provide sufficiently meaningful and reliable
projections over a time frame up to tens-of-thousands to hundreds-of-thousands of years.
Simply because such models can provide projections for those time periods does not mean
those projections are meaningful and reliable enough to establish a rational basis for
regulatory decisionmaking"); Ohio v. EPA, 638 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1980) (concluding that
the EPA's reliance on air quality model was arbitrary in the absence of any effort to test the
model's results against actual monitoring data).
87. See McGarity & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10765.
88. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
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information." 9 The Corps did not act in an arbitrary and capricious fashion by
relying on limited modeling information, particularly because it feared that
awaiting the results of further modeling would allow additional damage to the
birds' habitat to occur.
9 1
The courts have invalidated agency decisions that relied on modeling or
simulation exercises, however, in cases in which they have found that a particular
model was ill-suited to the activities to which it was applied92 or that the agency
was unable to justify building the model on apparently arbitrary assumptions.
93
Another ESA case provides a natural resources law example of the willingness of
the courts to reverse an agency's reliance on modeling or simulation techniques on
these grounds. 94 The ESA allows the FWS to issue an incidental take statement
(ITS) 95 that allows federal agencies to engage in activities that otherwise would
have violated the ESA's prohibition on the taking of endangered species. 96 When
the FWS decides to issue an ITS, it must specify in the ITS, among other things, the
amount of the incidental taking that is permitted.97 Although the courts have
indicated that, ideally, that amount should take the form of a specific number, they
have allowed the FWS to substitute a "meaningful surrogate" for the amount of the
permissible incidental take if identification of a specific number is not practical.
98
In one case, the court held that the FWS violated the ESA by using ecological
conditions as a surrogate for the amount of the permissible incidental take because
it failed to establish a link between the conditions chosen by the FWS in the ITS
and the extent of the incidental taking that would be caused by the Bureau of Land
90. Miccosukee Tribe, 420 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(invalidating EPA decision to establish zero-level maximum contaminant level goal under
the Safe Drinking Water Act for chemical based on application of linear, no-threshold model
of carcinogenesis, despite existence of evidence that there was a safe threshold level of
exposure); Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(invalidating treatment standard for hazardous waste established by EPA under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act because the assumptions on which a test for determining
whether a waste is hazardous was based did not fit the situation to which EPA applied it; the
court stated flatly that, as EPA admitted, "the model does not work"); Edison Elec. Inst. v.
EPA, 2 F.3d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (concluding that EPA failed to demonstrate a rational
relationship between test used to measure toxicity and the mineral processing wastes to
which it was applied).
93. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that EPA improperly listed a pollutant as a high-risk, hazardous air pollutant based
on the use of a generic air dispersion model that included assumptions that EPA conceded
were not accurate for that particular pollutant). See generally Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at
915-16; McGarity & Wagner, supra note 65, at 10759-61.
94. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D.
Cal. 2006).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C) (2000).
96. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B).
97. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3)(i) (2006).
98. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1137-
38 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
273 F.3d 1229, 1249-1250 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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The federal statutes that delegate authority to administrative agencies to protect
the environment from pollution or manage publicly owned land and resources
require that the agencies base many of their decisions on scientific determinations,
and sometimes require decisions to be based exclusively on scientific grounds.
These mandates create difficulties for the agencies when, as is often the case, the
relevant scientific knowledge is incomplete. Statutes that permit agencies to
premise their decisions on the best available science recognize that demanding that
decisions be based on scientific certainty is a chimerical objective in many
environmental policy contexts. These statutes address the reality of bounded
rationality by requiring that agency decisions conform to the known evidence and
to reasonable extrapolations from that evidence. Best available science mandates
have the capacity to enhance public trust in agency decisions and provide a
standard for judicial review of those decisions.
The environmental and natural resource management agencies have reacted to
bounded rationality by adopting a variety of models and related techniques that
permit them to simulate the unknown effects of human activities subject to the
agencies' jurisdiction based on organization and manipulation of a relatively small
and manageable body of available information. These proxy regimes, like mandates
that agencies act on the basis of the best available evidence, may counter the
tendency to defer making decisions on important issues until agencies believe that
they have mastered all aspects of the particular problem being addressed.
Models and the use of other simulation techniques such as reliance on
surrogates, however, are incapable of eliminating bounded rationality, and may
even exacerbate preexisting uncertainty if they are built upon flawed input or if
their output is improperly interpreted or applied. By mandating that agencies act on
the basis of the best available scientific evidence, and by endorsing (explicitly or
implicitly) the use of models, Congress, in a variety of pollution control and natural
resource management contexts, has decided that the risks of doing nothing pending
elimination of scientific uncertainty outweigh the risks of erroneous action in the
face of uncertainty.
The use of best available science mandates and modeling to address bounded
rationality has the potential to subvert the legislative agenda, however, if agencies
abuse their statutory discretion to proceed in the face of uncertainty by failing to
disclose the inevitable value judgments they must make when they engage in
analytical efforts such as modeling or by disguising such judgments in objective
terminology. Some of the cases in which the courts invalidated agency decisions
that stemmed from the application of models may provide examples of such
failures.
99. Id. at 1138; see also Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n, 273 F.3d at 1250-51 (reaching
a similar result in the context of an ITS for livestock management that would result in the
incidental taking of the desert tortoise).
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The next Part of this Article explores how the Forest Service has reacted to
bounded rationality in its attempts to comply with its obligation under the NFMA
to protect the biological diversity of the national forests. The final Part provides
suggestions for how to structure the Forest Service's efforts to promote diversity
using techniques such as modeling and decisions based on the best available
evidence so that the risk of unaccountable decision making and subversion of
statutory goals is minimized.
II. RELIANCE ON MODELING AND THE USE OF SURROGATES TO PROTECT
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS
The NFMA creates a planning process that requires the Forest Service, among
other things, to provide for the diversity of plant and animal communities in
national forests.1°° Part A below briefly describes the NFMA planning process as
well as the diversity protection component of that process. Part B explores several
contexts in which the Forest Service has used modeling to implement the NFMA's
planning provisions. Part C explores in greater detail the approaches to
implementation of the diversity mandate reflected in the agency's 1982, 2000, and
2005 land use planning regulations. In particular, it describes the agency's adoption
of an approach to diversity protection that relied on the identification and
protection of management indicator species and the subsequent abandonment of
that approach and its replacement by a much vaguer, self-imposed "best available
science" mandate. The discussion seeks to assess whether the Forest Service has
succeeded in crafting an approach to decision making in the face of scientific
uncertainty that achieves the benefits of modeling and the use of surrogates while
avoiding some of the pitfalls described above.
A. The National Forest Management Act's Planning
Process and the Diversity Provision
Although the Forest Service engaged in planning efforts before the adoption of
the NFMA in 1976, that statute created a more detailed, congressionally directed
planning regime than had previously existed. 101 Spurred in part by excessive use of
clearcutting practices, the NFMA planning provisions require the Forest Service to
prepare an assessment every ten years that describes the renewable resources in all
of the national forests, 102 a program every five years that includes planning
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2000).
101. Congress had previously directed the Forest Service to promulgate long-range,
systemwide plans in the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2000). 2 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN,
PUBLIC NATURAL REsouRcEs LAW § 10F:29 (2001); see also Michael J. Gippert & Vincent
L. DeWitte, The Nature of Land and Resource Management Planning Under the National
Forest Management Act, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 149 (1996); Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael
Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1 (1985)
(providing the most comprehensive discussion of the NFMA's planning requirements for the
national forests).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
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objectives over a forty-year period for all Forest Service activities, 10 3 and an annual
report evaluating actual activities in the national forests in relation to the program
planning objectives. 104
Of more direct relevance to this Article are the provisions governing the
planning process for individual units of the NFS. The NFMA mandates that the
Forest Service develop, maintain, and revise as appropriate land and resource
management plans (LRMPs) for each unit of the NFS, using a "systematic
interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical,
biological, economic, and other sciences."' 10 5 The planning process for individual
units of the NFS entails three steps: the Forest Service's promulgation of planning
regulations, 106 the adoption of land use plans for individual units that comport with
the regulations, 107 and the authorization of management actions (such as timber
sales, grazing permits, or special use permits for recreational uses) in conformity
with the applicable plan. 108
The NFMA specifies that the Forest Service's planning regulations include
guidelines for insuring "consideration of the economic and environmental aspects
of various systems of renewable resource management" in protecting forest
resources. 109 The statute also requires that land management plans achieve the
goals set forth in the Renewable Resource Program (updated every fifth fiscal year)
by "provid[ing] for diversity of plant and animal communities based on the
suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-
use objectives."' 10 The NFMA directs that, in promoting the substantive purposes
of the NFMA planning requirements, including the provision of plant and animal
diversity, the Forest Service appoint a committee of scientists to "provide scientific
and technical advice and counsel on proposed guidelines and procedures to assure
that an effective interdisciplinary approach is proposed and adopted." lI
The NFMA neither defines the term "diversity of plant and animal
communities" nor provides any yardstick for determining whether it exists." 2 The
absence of a definition may reflect Congress's recognition of its lack of technical
expertise and its recognition that scientific understanding of the concept would
evolve over time." 3 Although the absence of a definition of diversity reflects a
103. Id. § 1602.
104. Id. § 1606(c). For additional description of all aspects of the NFMA planning
process, see 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 101, at §§ 10F:31-51.
105. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a)-(b) (2000).
106. Id. § 1604(g).
107. Id. § 1604(e).
108. The NFMA provides that "[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other
instruments for the use and occupancy of [NFS] lands shall be consistent with the land
management plans." Id. § 1604(i).
109. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(A).
110. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
111. Id. § 1604(h)(1).
112. On the many possible meanings of biodiversity, see generally Fred Bosselman, A
Dozen Biodiversity Puzzles, 12 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 364 (2004). For a discussion of the
justifications for preserving biological diversity, see Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching the
Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18 EcoLOGY L.Q. 265 (1991).
113. See Greg D. Corbin, Comment, The United States Forest Service's Response to
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decision to afford the Forest Service considerable discretion in pursuing the
diversity mandate, the procedural requirements governing the planning process and
the requirement that the agency seek input from a Committee of Scientists serve as
constraints on that discretion.1 14 The Forest Service in fact shaped its initial
planning regulations, adopted in 1982, to conform to the recommendations of the
Committee. Among other things, the Committee urged the Forest Service to
manage for diversity in a manner that permits adaptation to advances in scientific
understanding. 1 5 One way to read the statutory mandate to provide diversity is that
it endorses ecosystem-based management. 
116
B. Modeling and the National Forest Management Act
1. The Demand for Forest Service Modeling
The need for the Forest Service to engage in modeling exercises to implement
its planning responsibilities under the NFMA stems from bounded rationality. As
two observers described the situation just a year after the adoption of the Forest
Service's 1982 NFMA planning regulations, "[t]he data required to satisfy [the
NFMA's] legal requirements [for planning] are far beyond those ever compiled by
the Forest Service or anyone else. The Forest Service, therefore, relies on judgment
to fill gaps in empirical knowledge and on quantitative, computerized, systematic,
and standardized analytical procedures."" 7 Similarly, a more recent analysis posits
that:
The complexity of forest ecosystems allows scientists to possess detailed
knowledge of ecosystem processes for only a few locations where case studies
have been done. Thus, managers are often faced with making decisions that
affect an entire landscape with only rudimentary information on ecosystem
parameters for the vast majority of the area involved. Models that simulate
forest succession under various conditions that may be of interest to managers
often require a higher level of detail. 18
Biodiversity Science, 29 ENvTL. L. 377, 380-81 (1999).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 381. For a description of the role of the Committee of Scientists in the
promulgation of NFMA planning regulations, see generally Brian Scott Pasko, Comment,
The Great Experiment that Failed? Evaluating the Role of a "Committee of Scientists " as a
Tool for Managing and Protecting Our Public Lands, 32 ENVTL. L. 509 (2002).
116. See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem
Management, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 309-10 (1994) (arguing that the diversity provision
"incorporates conservation biology considerations into the national forest planning and
management process").
117. Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 62, at 497. See also id. at 502 ("[R]equirements
for forest planning exceed the current state of knowledge about critical variables and their
relationships. The scientifically validated, empirical knowledge base underlying forest
planning is typically, rather than exceptionally, inadequate.").
118. J.R. Tester, A.M. Starfield & L.E. Frelich, Modeling for Ecosystem Management in
Minnesota Pine Forests, 80 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 313, 313 (1997).
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The process of compiling and analyzing the information necessary to conduct the
kind of planning envisioned by the NFMA has prompted the agency to rely on the
use of "quantitative, computerized, systematic, and standardized procedures. The
quantitative models the Forest Service has developed to meet the analytical
requirements that flow directly from the complexity of planning laws and
regulations have become a central feature of the current planning process in the
United States."" 9 By one account, an inventory of simulation models available in
1993 for forest planning and ecosystem management identified 250 different
software tools. 120
The Forest Service's reliance on modeling programs did not convert the
planning process into a purely technocratic exercise, devoid of discretion and
divorced from the need to exercise judgment. As explained above, efforts to
address bounded rationality through modeling and similar regimes cannot eliminate
the need to make value judgments in selecting a particular model for a particular
analytical purpose, deciding what information to feed into the model, and
interpreting the results provided by the model. 12 1 Moreover, land use planning
generally and Forest Service planning in particular involve a mix of technical
expertise and value judgments. 122 According to one observer, despite "strenuous
efforts to quantify important ecological processes to support a theory in simulation
model form, by far the larger body of what we know can only be expressed
qualitatively, comparatively, and inexactly."'
123
2. The Forest Service's Experience with Modeling
The Forest Service has relied on computer modeling in fulfilling its planning
responsibilities under the NFMA.124 For years, the Forest Service used a computer
program called Forest Planning (FORPLAN) in its planning efforts. FORPLAN
projected the possible production of goods and services from an NFS unit under
different management options. The agency entered a resource inventory into the
computer and used the program to calculate the forest's "benchmark" capacity to
produce goods and services under options that included maximum commodity
production, maximum amenity, and maximum present net market value.
FORPLAN then selected the management course that represented the greatest net
public benefit. 125 The Forest Service eventually abandoned the use of the
119. Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 62, at 515-16.
120. H. Michael Rauscher, Ecosystem Management Decision Support for Federal Forests
in the United States: A Review, 114 FoREST EcOLOGY & MGMT. 173, 184 (1999).
121. See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text.
122. Cf Cortner & Schweitzer, supra note 62, at 499 ("[P]lanning is fundamentally a
political process that defines winners and losers rather than simply a technical enterprise to
define truth .... ").
123. Rauscher, supra note 120, at 184.
124. See, e.g., Land and Resource Management Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,807, 26,816
(July 15, 1988) ("Various analytical models such as FORPLAN, IMPLAN, simulation
models, fire analysis models, transportation analysis models, cost-benefit tools, and fish and
wildlife habitat capability models may have been used during the planning process.").
125. 2 CoGGINs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 101, at § 10F:37 (quoting Constance Brooks,
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FORPLAN program when the Forest Service determined that the program had
become obsolete. 
126
For the most part, challenges to the Forest Service's use of FORPLAN to
comply with its land use planning obligations met a hostile judicial reception. In an
early attack on an NFMA land use plan, a district court described FORPLAN as "a
widely recognized and respected planning tool generally accepted by the planning
community."' 127 The Ninth Circuit rejected claims that the NFMA did not permit
the Forest Service to base its comparison of management alternatives for grazing
levels on FORPLAN analysis derived from management estimates inputted into the
computer program. 128 Holding that the agency did not act improperly, the court
stated that "[i]t is enough that there is evidence in the record that the grazing output
levels were derived by professional estimation and were not arbitrarily selected."
' 129
The same court refused to overturn a computer-generated conclusion that
wilderness designation was inappropriate. 130 The court declared that it was not "in
a position to prefer [the environmental-group plaintiff's] view of the [Forest
Service's] software over the [Forest Service's] explanation. [The plaintiff] may
well disagree with the substantive decisions informing the program design.
Nevertheless, it has given us no reason to doubt the [Forest Service's] position."' 3 1
Later, the Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the claim that a LRMP improperly authorized
grazing, disagreed with the contention that the Forest Service had improperly fed
"predetermined" grazing outcomes into its FORPLAN computer program. 32 The
court characterized the attack as one based on a misapprehension of the function of
FORPLAN:
At least at this stage of its development, FORPLAN is not an artificial life
form. It is, purely and simply, an analytic modeling tool. It provides, among
other things, an analysis of the economic consequences of various planning
assumptions. Plaintiffs complain that some of these assumptions included
grazing. However, examination of alternatives is precisely what is required of
the Forest Service.' 
33
Multiple Use Versus Dominant Use: Can Federal Land Use Planning Fulfill the Principles
of Multiple Use for Mineral Development?, 33 ROCKY MT. MiN. L. INsT. 1-1, 1-20 to 1-23
(1988)).
126. See Land and Resource Management Planning, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,370, 58,370 (Nov.
14, 1996) (describing amendment to Forest Service directives that "removed requirements
that have become obsolete-such as mandating the use of FORPLAN, now an outdated
computer model").
127. Griffin v. Yeutter, 20 ENvTL. L. REP. 20,400 (S.D. Cal. 1990). On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Forest Service violated neither its own NFMA regulations nor NEPA in
relying on FORPLAN during the planning process. The court labeled the attacks as
challenges to the agency's "choice of methodology," and concluded that reliance on
FORPLAN did not preclude consideration of a reasonable range of alternatives. Griffin v.
Yeutter, No. 90-55368, 1991 WL 178134, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 11, 1991) (unpublished table
decision).
128. Nevada Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir. 1993).
129. Id.
130. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1520-23 (9th Cir. 1992).
131. Id. at 1522.
132. Wilderness Soc'y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999).
133. Id. at 1135-36.
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Ultimately, the court held that the Forest Service was "plainly entitled to identify
'parameters and criteria"' in generating alternatives for final consideration, and that
the agency did not violate the NFMA in using FORPLAN to assist its analysis.' 34
The Ninth Circuit was not the only inhospitable forum for attacks on the Forest
Service's use of FORPLAN. In another case, an environmental group challenged a
LRMP by charging that the Forest Service relied on inappropriate assumptions
regarding the recreation values of timbering that provided input into the FORPLAN
model. 135 The Forest Service's overestimate of the benefits of timbering to
recreation allegedly caused the program to assume that timber harvesting was
necessary for recreation. The district court found nothing in the record to support
the claim that the input was unreasonable and rejected the challenge. 136
An attack on the Forest Service's use of the FORPLAN model to perform its
planning functions succeeded in one case, in which the court agreed with an
environmental group's argument that the timber price assumptions that FORPLAN
incorporated were inaccurate and obsolete. 137 The agency violated its own
regulations by using ten-year-old information instead of current inventory data
based on the "best available data."'138 Because the agency was unable to show that
use of the erroneous data did not appreciably affect planning results, the court
found that portion of the plan inaccurate, 139 although it rejected challenges to other
aspects of FORPLAN's application. 140
The courts were therefore very deferential to the manner in which the Forest
Service used the FORPLAN model to assist in its NFMA planning functions. In the
only reported case in which a court accepted a FORPLAN-based attack, the court
found that the Forest Service violated its own regulations in providing input for the
computer analysis. 141 Absent that kind of demonstrable mistake, litigants could not
convince the courts to closely scrutinize the analysis generated by FORPLAN or
the manner in which it affected the Forest Service's planning decisions.
The few litigation efforts to challenge Forest Service model-based planning
decisions in contexts other than alleged NFMA diversity mandate noncompliance
134. Id. at 1136 (quoting Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1522).
135. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, 105 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club,
523 U.S. 726 (1998).
136. Id.
137. Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970, 993 (D. Colo. 1989).
138. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(d)).
139. Cf Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. 96-2244, 1997 WL 295308 at *13-14
(7th Cir. May 28, 1997) (unpublished table decision). In that case, the court accepted a
challenge to an LRMP based on the contention that the Forest Service used outdated data in
running a computer program known as Habitat Evaluation Program (HEP) that was designed
to predict how the plan would affect population levels of animal species. Although the court
found that the agency had adequately defended the use of the HEP computer program, it
concluded that the agency did not respond sufficiently to the charge that the data fed into the
program were flawed. Id. at *13. "As the plaintiffs point out, a computer program is only as
reliable as its input; thus, they argue that if you put garbage in, you get garbage out." Id. at
"12.
140. CitizensforEnvtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 991.
141. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
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tended to be similarly unsuccessful. In one case, for example, a group of canoe
outfitters criticized a travel zone model that the Forest Service used to project travel
patterns in a wilderness area. 42 In rejecting the attack, the court noted that the
model:
was developed over nearly two decades and includes extensive studies based on
travel diaries, as well as expert opinion and a computer model. The Outfitter
Plaintiffs' challenge to these evaluation techniques is not well taken. The law is
clear that a court may not "second-guess methodological choices made by an
agency in its area of expertise." 1
43
3. Modeling to Protect Biological Diversity
a. Modeling Choices
In seeking to protect wildlife from human activities, government and private
planners have used two different simulation approaches. The first is population
viability analysis (PVA), which involves the incorporation of information on
habitat quality into models used to predict wildlife population viability. 14 The
second seeks to simulate the effects of various human activities, such as
management actions approved by government agencies, on the landscapes in which
wildlife are found. 145 PVA analysis is based on a species census and an evaluation
of the direct impact of the activities being contemplated on population numbers. A
habitat-based model uses habitat loss as a proxy for the impact of the actions being
considered on species viability. 146 Both approaches rely on assumptions about the
manner in which humans and wildlife interact, and both produce projections of
future conditions that are of uncertain accuracy. 47 The Forest Service has
employed both in its efforts to protect plant and animal diversity through the
adoption of land use plans and the implementation of site-specific management
actions that are consistent with those plans.
142. County of St. Louis v. Thomas, 967 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D. Minn. 1997).
143. Id. (quoting Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. Schultz, 992 F.2d 977, 981 (9th
Cir. 1993)). Attacks on the Forest Service's use of computer models have also arisen in the
context of the Forest Service's alleged noncompliance with NEPA. See Cortner &
Schweitzer, supra note 62, at 512 (describing a successful challenge to a computer scoring
system the Forest Service used to support its wilderness recommendations because the model
failed to supply the kind of site-specific analysis NEPA required).
144. Michael A. Larson, Frank R. Thompson III, Joshua J. Millspaugh, William D. Dijak,
& Stephen R. Shifley, Linking Population Viability, Habitat Suitability, and Landscape
Simulation Models for Conservation Planning, 180 EcOLOGICAL MODELLING 103, 104
(2004).
145. Id. at 105 (asserting that "[miethods for habitat modeling based on landscape
simulations and PVA modeling based on habitat quality are well developed, but no published
study of which we are aware has effectively joined them in a single, comprehensive
analysis"). Id.
146. Brennan et al., supra note 32, at 432.
147. See Larson et al., supra note 144, at 114-15.
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b. The 1982 Planning Regulations
The Forest Service adopted its initial NFMA planning regulations in 1979, after
extensive consultation with the Committee of Scientists. 148 Three years later, the
Forest Service amended the 1979 regulations 149 "to streamline the land
management planning process,"'150 again after consulting with the Committee of
Scientists. At the time the Forest Service adopted the 1982 regulations, scientific
understanding of biodiversity was rudimentary. The prevailing view among
scientists at the time was that the number of species in an area provides an accurate
representation of the area's biodiversity. 15' The 1982 planning regulations required
the agency to assess the impact of management actions on management indicator
species (MIS) because the Forest Service believed that population changes in these
MIS provided a gauge on the impacts of management actions on other species as
well. 152
The 1982 planning regulations required that each land use plan include
monitoring and evaluation requirements that would provide a basis for a periodic
determination of the effects of management practices. 53 The regulations also
directed planners to manage fish and wildlife habitat to maintain "viable
populations" of existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species. The
regulations defined a "viable population" for these purposes as "one which has the
estimated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its
continued existence is well distributed in the planning area."' 154 To insure the
maintenance of viable populations, the regulations required that land use plans
provide sufficient habitat "to support, at least, a minimum number of reproductive
individuals" and that the habitat be well distributed to permit those individuals to
interact with others in the planning area. 1
55
148. See National Forest System Land and Resource Planning, 44 Fed. Reg. 53,928,
53,928 (Sept. 17, 1979). The Secretary of Agriculture, with the assistance of the National
Academy of Sciences, selected the Committee, which was comprised of experts from outside
the Forest Service. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 101, at 12 & n.211 (listing the
members of the Committee).
149. National Forest System Land and Resource Planning, 47 Fed. Reg. 43,026, 43,026
(Sept. 30, 1982).
150. National Forest Management System Land and Resource Management Planning, 47
Fed. Reg. 7678, 7678 (Feb. 22, 1982) (proposed rule).
151. See Corbin, supra note 113, at 392. Corbin adds that, more recently:
[S]cientists [have] recognize[d] that biodiversity is far more than the simple
sum total of species found within an arbitrarily defined geographic locale. For
instance, biodiversity is currently seen within a hierarchical paradigm
encompassing levels of biological organization from genes to ecosystems. In
addition, each level of the hierarchy comprises compositional, structural, and
functional elements.
Id.
152. Anna M. Seidman & Douglas S. Burdin, Forest Wildlife Management: A Legal
Battlegroundfor a Scientific Dilemma, 20 NAT. REsouRcEs & ENV'T 40, 41 (2005).




MODELING AND EVALUATION OF SURROGA TES
The 1982 regulations required that vertebrate and invertebrate species in the
planning area be "identified and selected as management indicator species" as a
means of estimating the effects of alternative management actions on fish and
wildlife populations.156 The plan documents also had to explain the reasons for
selecting those MIS. The regulations directed planning officials to select MIS
"because their population changes are believed to indicate the effects of
management activities."'157 MIS were supposed to include representatives, where
appropriate, of plant and animal species listed by federal or state agencies as
endangered or threatened, species with special habitat needs that might be
significantly influenced by management programs, species commonly hunted or
fished, non-game species of special interest, and any additional plant or animal
species "selected because their population changes are believed to indicate the
effects of management activities on other species of selected major biological
communities or on water quality."15 8 The regulations specified that, "[o]n the basis
of available scientific information," planners were to "estimate the effects of
changes in vegetation type, timber age classes, community composition, rotation
age, and year-long suitability of habitat related to mobility of management
indicator species. Where appropriate, measures to mitigate adverse effects shall be
prescribed." 1
59
Finally, the regulations parroted but amplified the NFMA's diversity mandate.
They required that
forest planning provide for diversity of plant and animal communities and tree
species consistent with the overall multiple-use objectives of the planning area.
Such diversity shall be considered throughout the planning process. Inventories
shall include quantitative data making possible the evaluation of diversity in
terms of its prior and present condition. For each planning alternative, the
interdisciplinary team shall consider how diversity will be affected by various
mixes of resource outputs and uses, including proposed management
practices. 160
The MIS approach to protecting biodiversity proceeds on the premise "that a
single species can act as a bellwether for environmental change. According to this
concept, the species is so closely tied to its environment that fluctuations in its
population directly reflect environmental changes that impact other species as
well."161 The approach was attractive to those engaged in forest planning because it
avoided the need to engage in the more burdensome task of monitoring and
managing all species found in a particular ecosystem.' 62 It was a relatively




160. Id. § 219.26.
161. Corbin, supra note 113, at 397.
162. As Corbin has noted:
The advantages are obvious. In an age of budgetary and personnel constraints,
land management agencies like the Forest Service can not afford outlays of
resources necessary to individually manage each species in an ecosystem. The
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sophisticated method of simulating the effects of management actions on diversity
in that it allowed modelers to consider a variety of factors, including:
[G]enetics, demographics, habitat needs, spatial distribution, inter- and intra-
population dynamics, and environmental influences on the continued existence
of a population. With such a broad scope of relevant factors, PVA is capable of
incorporating many levels of the biodiversity hierarchy. Even more powerful is
its ability to link those factors to population extinction probabilities. Once the
critical factors in a population's survival are hypothesized, land managers can
estimate how many reproductive individuals are necessary to maintain a healthy
population over a chosen period of time.1
63
It soon became apparent, however, that the MIS approach to protecting
biodiversity was not a panacea. Even though it is less resource-intensive than an
approach based upon monitoring of all species within an ecosystem, it nevertheless
requires the accumulation of large amounts of information, and sometimes the
information is difficult to obtain. In addition, the extrapolation from the impacts of
management actions on one or a select small group of species to the effects of those
actions on an entire ecosystem upon which the entire approach depends is fraught
with uncertainty. This is particularly likely if little is understood about the natural
fluctuations of the MIS. 164
These difficulties prompted the Forest Service to consider using the habitat-
based approach rather than the population viability approach. Under this second
approach, planners do not seek to keep track of the population numbers of the
designated MIS. Instead, they assess the effects of management actions on the
habitat of the MIS based on the assumption that "the presence of adequate healthy
habitat for a species would indicate the presence of viable populations of those
species." 165 This "proxy-on-proxy" approach has been described as follows:
For this approach, the Forest Service designates the first proxy level by
selecting several MISs that the Service believes will represent the needs of
various types of wildlife that live throughout the forest and share the same
habitat needs as the designated MISs. Each MIS acts as an indicator, or proxy,
for many other species. The Forest Service does not inventory or monitor the
population of each MIS, but instead designates certain types and quantities of
ability to meet a seemingly impossible obligation to maintain viable
populations of all wildlife by simply monitoring a handful of species is to move
from the impossible to the probable.
Id.
163. Id. at 396.
164. Id. at 397-98. Corbin asserts that:
It is simply naive, in an ecological sense, to assume that effects on one species
will mirror those on all other species within an ecosystem .... Choosing an
appropriate indicator species requires a detailed understanding of the species
selected, how it reacts to changes in its habitat, and how the larger community
reflects those changes. For most of the nation's forest system, the detailed data
required to select indicator species did not exist when NFMA was passed, and
likely does not exist in an appreciably greater amount today.
Id.
165. Seidman & Burdin, supra note 152, at 41.
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habitat that it deems sufficient to maintain viable populations of the selected
MISs. The Service then assesses the impact of a proposed management activity
on the habitats and, consequently, on the populations of the MISs and the
species that the MISs represent. 166
The benefit of the proxy-on-proxy simulation approach is that it avoids the need
to do any population monitoring. The agency can fulfill its responsibility to protect
biodiversity through the planning process simply by assuming that if sufficient
habitat acreage for the MIS (as defined by the agency's scientists) remains
following a particular management action such as a timber harvest, then a viable
population of the MIS must also exist. Because the MIS is a surrogate for the other
species present in the area affected, a viable population of MIS necessarily
translates into plant and animal diversity sufficient to satisfy the NFMA planning
provisions. 167 It may not even be necessary for the habitat to exist in any particular
location or condition. 168
Courts have taken divergent approaches when faced with the question of
whether the proxy-on-proxy simulation approach is consistent with the Forest
Service's responsibility to provide for diversity of plant and animal
communities.169 The Ninth Circuit first addressed the validity of that approach in
Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Service. 170 The issue
in the case was whether the Forest Service complied with its regulations in
implementing the diversity requirement, in particular, with the regulatory provision
that dictated that fish and wildlife habitat be managed to maintain viable vertebrate
populations.' 7 1 The environmental group plaintiffs contended that the agency
violated the statutory diversity requirement and the viability regulation by failing to
examine the population dynamics of MIS in old-growth forests in which timber
harvests were scheduled. 172 The Forest Service responded that its habitat viability
analysis sufficed. 173 The court approved the agency's conclusion that a species
would remain viable as long as the percentage of each type of habitat (such as
nesting, feeding, or denning) remaining after the timber sales would be greater than
166. Id.
167. The burdens on the agency of pursuing the proxy-on-proxy approach are particularly
light if the agency collects the habitat data while making timber inventories. See Corbin,
supra note 113, at 401.
168. Thus, Corbin asserts, "[d]isturbance, such as logging, is not precluded because its
impact on the species will never be detected." Id.
169. The courts also have addressed the validity of the Forest Service's use of models or
surrogates in connection with other NFMA requirements concerning habitat for MIS. See,
e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV-05-189-E-BLW, 2006 WL
2920 10, at * 1, *4 (D. Idaho Feb. 7, 2006) (holding that the Forest Service acted improperly
by using a model for estimating the effects of grazing in seeking to comply with NFMA
regulation requiring that forest plans determine "the suitability and potential capability of
[NFS] lands for producing forage for grazing animals and for providing habitat for [MIS]").
170. 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996).
171. Id. at 758.
172. Id. at 760.
173. Id. at 759.
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required for the species to survive.174 According to the court, the assumption was
"eminently reasonable"'' 75 and the Forest Service's analysis was sound because it
used all of the scientific data then available. 1
76
In subsequent cases, the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest Service's approval of
timber sales violated the 1982 regulations implementing the NFMA's diversity
requirement because, even though the proxy-on-proxy approach is valid as a
general proposition, the agency relied on habitat monitoring methodologies that
were arbitrary and capricious. 177 The court summarized its precedents concerning
the legality of the Forest Service's reliance on the proxy-on-proxy approach as
follows: the agency could satisfy the diversity requirement by assessing the impact
of particular management actions such as timber harvests on habitat "only where
both the Forest Service's knowledge of what quality and quantity of habitat is
necessary to support the species and the Forest Service's method for measuring the
existing amount of that habitat are reasonably reliable and accurate." 178
174. Id. at 760-62.
175. Id. at 761.
176. Id. at 762.
177. Earth Island Inst. v. U. S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the Forest Service improperly relied on habitat analyses in lieu of population
monitoring where there was no evidence that it consulted current or accurate field studies
and failed to identify the methodology it used in determining what constitutes suitable
habitat); Idaho Sporting Cong., Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2002);
see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 234 F. App'x 440, 444 (9th Cir. 2007)
(invalidating proxy-on-proxy analysis because the Forest Service neither analyzed acreage
needed by MIS nor analyzed how much suitable acreage would remain in the project area
after the project was completed); Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. Austin, 430 F.3d 1057, 1063-65 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that the Forest Service violated the diversity mandate by assuming that
commercial thinning and prescribed burning activities in old-growth forests would be
beneficial to old-growth dependent species on the basis of an unverified hypothesis).
178. Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1250 (9th Cir.
2005); see also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 234 F. App'x at 444 (stating that the Forest Service
may only use proxy-on-proxy approach if its methodology is reliable in that it reasonably
ensures that the proxy results mirror reality); Cascadia Wildlands Project v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1163 (D. Or. 2005) (stating that "if the methodology used for
evaluating the effect of a plan on MIS populations is reasonably accurate, there is no
absolute requirement that the Forest Service conduct population counts of MIS when
analyzing management alternatives"); League of Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountain
Biodiversity Project v. Bosworth, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1303 (D. Or. 2005) (stating that,
"[in the Ninth Circuit .... habitat analysis as a proxy for monitoring population trends is
sufficient under the 1982 regulations where the methodology utilized by the Forest Service is
sound").
In a case involving alleged noncompliance with the monitoring requirements of a NFMA
forest plan, the court stated that the reliability of habitat capability models "may be
jeopardized in either of two ways: If either 'monitoring were not taking place, or if the on-
going monitoring reveals that the [habitat capability model] is not meeting expectations,'
then the Forest Service cannot rely on the surrogate methodology of the model." Envtl. Prot.
Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting Gifford
Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004))
(emphasis in original). The court in Gifford Pinchot held that the Forest Service may use
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Other courts entirely refused to allow the Forest Service to rely on the proxy-on-
proxy approach. In Sierra Club v. Martin, for example, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that habitat analysis did not comply with the requirement of the 1982
regulations that the Forest Service monitor population trends of MIS and their
relationships to habitat changes. 179 The court held that the agency's approval of
timber sales was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to gather quantitative
data on MIS and use the data to measure the impact of habitat changes on the
forest's diversity. 80 Other courts agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the 1982
regulations did not permit the Forest Service to substitute habitat information for
actual, quantitative population data.'81
c. The 2000 Planning Regulations
The Forest Service adopted the first substantial revisions to the 1982 planning
rules in November 2000, just three months before the end of the Clinton
Administration. 182 Those regulations never went into effect, however. Acting at
changes in habitat to assess whether an agency's actions would violate the prohibition on
jeopardizing species listed under the ESA if it "'reasonably ensures"' that the proxy results
mirror reality." 378 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Idaho Sporting Cong., 305 F.3d at 972-73).
179. Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1, 7 & n.10 (1lth Cir. 1999). The 1982 regulations
provided that "[p]opulation trends of the [MIS] will be monitored and relationships to habitat
changes will be determined." Id. at 5 (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1998)).
180. Id. at 7. The Forest Service lacked population data for half of the MIS in the forest
in which the sales had been proposed. A federal district court later interpreted Martin as
allowing the Forest Service to rely on estimating procedures such as sampling or surveys to
satisfy MIS data collection requirements. In particular, it concluded that the Forest Service
may rely on sampling data for fish MIS, numerical survey data for vertebrate MIS, and
descriptive reports for plant MIS. Forest Conservation Council v. Jacobs, 374 F. Supp. 2d
1187, 1203--04 (N.D. Ga. 2005), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ouachita Watch League v.
Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163 (1 lth Cir. 2006).
181. E.g., Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1225-27 (10th Cir. 2004); see
also Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 2006); Utah Envtl.
Cong. v. Zieroth, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1271-72 (D. Utah 2002) (holding that Forest
Service regulations require collection of quantitative data on populations to measure the
impact of habitat changes on forest diversity and that habitat data may not be used as a
proxy); Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 180 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (D.N.M. 2001)
(holding that the Forest Service's regulations require that it collect population data, not just
habitat trend data, for MIS). The Tenth Circuit also held, however, that the agency need not
develop forest-wide data if it can determine the viability of the MIS at issue without a forest-
wide survey, but that it must engage in good faith efforts to confirm the presence or absence
of MIS. Utah Envtl. Cong., 372 F.3d at 1230. In an earlier case, the Tenth Circuit held that
the diversity regulations did not require the Forest Service to collect population data or make
data-based population viability assessments in the absence of any evidence that MIS existed
in the affected area. Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir.
1999); cf. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1286 (10th Cir. 2007) (confirming
that although the 1982 regulations required quantitative population data, "we otherwise
imposed no specific requirements on the type of data that must be collected," and upholding
the Forest Service's conclusion that the available population data were scientifically useful).
182. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 65 Fed. Reg.
67,514 (Nov. 9, 2000).
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least in part in response to concerns over the 2000 regulations expressed by the
Society of American Foresters,183 the Department of Agriculture first extended by
one year the effective date of the 2000 regulations'84 and then delayed compliance
until the promulgation of a new final planning rule. 
85
The 2000 regulations required that each LRMP "contain a practicable, effective,
and efficient monitoring strategy to evaluate sustainability in the plan area" and that
the strategy "require monitoring of appropriate plan decisions and characteristics of
sustainability. ' ' i 86 In particular, the regulations required monitoring of both
ecosystem and species diversity. With respect to the former, the regulations
required evaluation of "the status and trend of selected physical and biological
characteristics of ecosystem diversity" and documentation of "the reasons for
selection of characteristics to be monitored, monitoring objectives, methodology,
and designation of] critical values that will prompt reviews of plan decisions., 87
Species diversity monitoring had to involve evaluation of "focal species"' 88 and
selected "species-at-risk." 1
89
183. The Society of American Foresters is "the national scientific and educational
organization representing the forestry profession in the United States." Society of American
Foresters, Mission Statement, available at http:/www.safnet.org/who/whoweare.cfm.
184. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of
Deadline Compliance; Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,552 (May 17, 2001) (asserting
that the agency was not prepared to fully implement the rule nationwide).
185. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of
Deadline Compliance; Interim Final Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,341 (May 20, 2002). For
discussion of the Bush Administration's delays in implementing the 2000 planning
regulations, see Alyson Flournoy, Robert L. Glicksman & Margaret Clune, Regulations in
Name Only: How the Bush Administration's National Forest Planning Rule Frees the Forest
Service from Mandatory Standards and Public Accountability, Center for Progressive
Reform White Paper 508 (June 2005), at 5-6, available at
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Forests_508.pdf.
186. 36 C.F.R. § 219.11 (2001).
187. Id. § 219.11(a)(1)(i).
188. The regulations defined focal species as follows:
Focal species are surrogate measures used in the evaluation of ecological
sustainability, including species and ecosystem diversity. The key characteristic
of a focal species is that its status and trend provide insights to the integrity of
the larger ecological system to which it belongs. Individual species, or groups
of species that use habitat in similar ways or which perform similar ecological
functions, may be identified as focal species. Focal species serve an umbrella
function in terms of encompassing habitats needed for many other species, play
a key role in maintaining community structure or processes, are sensitive to the
changes likely to occur in the area, or otherwise serve as an indicator of
ecological sustainability. Certain focal species may be used as surrogates to
represent ecological conditions that provide for viability of some other species,
rather than directly representing the population dynamics of those other
species.
Id. § 219.36 (emphasis added).
189. Species at risk were defined as:
[flederally listed endangered, threatened, candidate, and proposed species and
other species for which loss of viability, including reduction in distribution or
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The 2000 regulations required monitoring of ecological conditions, but did not
generally require population monitoring. The regulations, however, specified that a
particular plan's monitoring strategy "may require population monitoring for some
focal species and some species-at-risk," which could be accomplished by methods
such as population occurrence and presence/absence data, sampling population
characteristics, using population indices to track relative population trends, or
inferring population status from ecological conditions. 190 Planning officials were to
decide whether to monitor populations, and if they decided to monitor, to select the
methods for doing so based on factors that included the degree of risk to the
species, the degree to which particular species characteristics lend themselves to
monitoring, the reasons for listing a species as a focal species or species-at-risk,
and the strength of association between ecological conditions and population
dynamics.' 9' The regulations stated that population trend monitoring "is often
appropriate in those cases where risk to species viability is high and population
characteristics cannot be reliably inferred from ecological conditions."' 192 Any
document authorizing site-specific action also had to describe required monitoring
and evaluation. 193 Monitoring methods could be changed to reflect new information
without the need to amend or revise the applicable LRMP. 1
9 4
The regulations designated the first priority for NFMA planning and
management to be the maintenance or restoration of ecological sustainability of the
national forests. 195 The Forest Service regarded both ecosystem and species
diversity as components of ecological sustainability.' 96 Ecosystem diversity
included several characteristics, including major vegetation types, water resources,
soil resources, air resources, and focal species that provide "insights to the larger
ecological systems with which they are associated.' 197 Species diversity was
defined in terms of species characteristics that included "the number, distribution,
and geographic ranges of plant and animal species, including focal species and
species-at-risk that serve as surrogate measures of species diversity. Species-at-
risk and focal species must be identified for the plan area."
198
Planners had to evaluate ecological sustainability by describing the current
status of ecosystem and species diversity, risks to ecological sustainability, the
cumulative effects of human and natural disturbances, and the contributions of NFS
lands to the ecological sustainability of all lands within the area being analyzed. 199
The evaluation of ecosystem diversity had to include "[i]nformation about focal
species that provide insights to the integrity of the larger ecological system to
abundance, is a concern within the plan area. Other species-at-risk may include
sensitive species and state listed species. A species-at-risk also may be selected
as a focal species.
Id.
190. Id. § 219.11(a)(1)(ii)(B).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 219.11(a)(1)(ii)(C).
193. Id. § 219.11(b).
194. Id. § 219.11(c).
195. Id. § 219.2.
196. Id. § 219.20(a)(1).
197. Id. § 219.20(a)(1)(i).
198. Id. § 219.20(a)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).
199. Id. § 219.20(a)(2).
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which they belong." 2°° The evaluation of species diversity had to include, "as
appropriate," assessments of the risks to species viability and the identification of
ecological conditions needed to maintain species viability over time. Individual
species assessments for the viability of any endangered, threatened, or candidate
species under the ESA were mandatory, while for all other species, the regulations
authorized a variety of evaluative approaches, including "individual species
assessments and assessments of focal species or other indicators used as
surrogates in the evaluation of ecological conditions needed to maintain species
viability."' '2
The regulations required that plan decisions affecting ecological sustainability
be based on the evaluations of ecosystem and species diversity. Plan decisions
affecting ecosystem diversity had to provide for maintenance or restoration of the
characteristics of ecosystem composition and structure within the range of
variability expected under natural disturbance regimes. Where definition of the
range of variability was impractical, plan decisions had to "provide for measurable
progress toward maintaining or restoring ecosystem diversity" based on
independently peer-reviewed scientific methods other than the expected range of
variability to maintain or restore ecosystem diversity. 2°2 Plan decisions affecting
species diversity had to "provide for ecological conditions that the responsible
official determines provide a high likelihood that those conditions are capable of
supporting over time the viability of native and desired non-native species well
distributed throughout their ranges within the plan area."
20 3
The planning regulations issued during the Clinton Administration thus set as
the first priority of the NFMA planning process the maintenance or restoration of
ecological sustainability. The regulations appeared to treat ecosystem and species
diversity as equally important components of ecological sustainability. Planning
officials had to conduct evaluations of both kinds of diversity, and plan decisions
had to protect both kinds as well. Every LRMP had to include a monitoring strategy
to evaluate sustainability in the plan area. The 2000 regulations replaced the
concept of the MIS with two new surrogate measures of both components of
ecological sustainability: focal species and species-at-risk. Both focal species and
species at risk had to be evaluated as part of the process of monitoring species
diversity. In addition, the regulations included focal species as one of the
characteristics of ecosystem diversity because such species provide insight into the
condition of the larger ecosystem of which they are a part.
The regulations did not mandate population monitoring of affected species in all
cases. They recognized, however, that population monitoring might be necessary
for focal species and species at risk through any of several illustrative
methodologies, based on factors such as the degree of risk being experienced by the
200. Id. § 219.20(a)(2)(i)(A). The agency also had to describe the effects of human
activity on ecosystem diversity. Id. § 219.20(a)(2)(i)(E).
201. Id. § 219.20(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). The regulations provided that, with the
exception of species listed under the ESA, assessments of functional, taxonomic, or habitat
groups rather than individual species "may be appropriate" for species groups that contain
many species. Id.
202. Id. § 219.20(b)(1).
203. Id. § 219.20(b)(2)(i).
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species, the degree to which the species lend themselves to population monitoring,
and the strength of the association between ecological conditions and population
dynamics. The regulations declared population monitoring to be particularly
appropriate in situations marked by high risk to species viability and inability to
infer reliable population characteristics from ecological conditions. In short, the
2000 regulations continued to rely heavily on the effects of management actions on
designated species as surrogates for the ability to maintain plant and animal
diversity in the national forests.
d. The 2005 Planning Regulations
Based on its conclusion that the 2000 planning regulations were difficult to
implement and failed to clarify the "programmatic nature" of land and resource
management planning,20 4 the Forest Service completely scrapped the 2000
regulations and replaced them with a new set of regulations in 2005.205 The Forest
Service, which adopted the new regulations without convening a Committee of
Scientists, 2° characterized the 2005 regulations as "a paradigm shift in land
management planning." 2°7 For one thing, although the 2005 regulations nominally
retain sustainability as the overall goal of the NFMA planning process, 20 8 the
regulations deemphasize the ecological component of sustainability by declaring
sustainability to be composed of three "interrelated and interdependent"
components: social, economic, and ecological sustainability. 2°9 Included among the
changes in approach reflected in the 2005 regulations was a shift away from
assessment of species diversity to assessment of ecosystem diversity as a means of
implementing the NFMA's diversity requirement. In particular, the 2005
regulations abandoned the approaches reflected in both the 1982 and 2000
regulations for monitoring the effect of management actions on species selected
204. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 67 Fed. Reg.
72,770, 72,770-71 (proposed Dec. 6, 2002) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
205. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg.
1023 (Jan. 5, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
206. See Flournoy et al., supra note 185, at 7.
207. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1024.
Representative Tom Udall of New Mexico called the 2005 regulations "a radical overhaul of
forest policy." Floumoy et al., supra note 185, at 7 (quoting Juliet Eilperin, New Rules
Issued for National Forests; Some Environmental Protections Eased, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,
2004, at Al).
208. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10 (2006).
209. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at
1028; see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10 (2005) (stating that "sustainability, for any unit of the
National Forest System, has three interrelated and interdependent elements: social,
economic, and ecological," and that a LRMP "can contribute to sustainability by creating a
framework to guide on-the-ground management of projects and activities," but cannot itself
ensure sustainability). For discussion of the shift in emphasis away from ecological
sustainability, see Flournoy et al., supra note 185, at 9-11; Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling
in Opposite Directions: Roadless Area Management Under the Clinton and Bush
Administrations, 34 ENvTL. L. 1143, 1172-76, 1204-07 (2004).
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based on their capacity to serve as surrogates for the diversity of plant and animal
species in the affected planning area as a whole.
The 2005 regulations state that the overall goal of the ecological element of
sustainability is "to provide a framework to contribute to sustaining native
ecological systems by providing ecological conditions to support diversity of native
plant and animal species in the plan area., 210 Achieving the goal "will satisfy the
statutory requirement to provide for diversity of plant and animal communities
based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet
overall multiple-use objectives. 21' Unlike the 2000 regulations, the 2005
regulations declare ecosystem diversity to be the "primary means by which a plan
contributes to sustaining ecological systems" and LRMPs therefore "must establish
a framework to provide the characteristics of ecosystem diversity in the plan
area., 21 2 The plan must include additional measures to protect species diversity
only if planning officials determine that the plan provisions designed to protect
ecosystem diversity are insufficient to provide appropriate ecological conditions for
specific endangered or threatened species, species of concern, or species of
interest.213 It is within that broad framework that the 2005 regulations address the
responsibility of planning officials to rely on the "best available science" and to
take steps to protect the diversity of plant and animal species.
210. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a) (2006).
211. Id.
212. Id. § 219.10(a)(1). The Forest Service now defines ecosystem diversity as "the
variety and relative extent of ecosystem types including their composition, structure, and
processes." FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK 1909.12, § 43.1. Agency officials are to evaluate
ecosystem diversity by identifying selected ecosystem characteristics, assessing their natural
variation under historic disturbance regimes, and comparing that to existing and projected
future conditions. Id. § 43.1.1. Compare the following definition of ecosystem diversity:
The concept of 'ecosystem diversity' refers to the variety of biological
communities and their physical settings and can be used to associate species
with their required habitat. This association between habitat and ecosystem
diversity is possible because a species' habitat is selected from the ecosystems
available to that species (i.e., habitat is a subset of ecosystems for a specific
species).
Seidman & Burdin, supra note 152, at 42.
213. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(a)(2) (2006). "Species-of-concern" are those species for which
their continued existence is a concern and listing under the ESA may occur. Id. § 219.16.
"Species-of-interest" are species for which the responsible planning official determines that
management actions may be necessary or desirable to achieve ecological or other multiple
use objectives. Id. The Forest Service directives will describe "a systematic, scientifically
credible, and efficient approach, using existing information, to identify species-of-concern
and species-of-interest." National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning;
Removal of 2000 Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1048 (Jan. 5, 2005) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219); see also FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK § 1909.12, ch. 43.22b-43.2c (defining
species-of-concern as "species for which the Responsible Official determines management
actions may be necessary to prevent listing under [the ESA]" and species-of-interest as
"species for which the Responsible Official determines that management actions may be
necessary or desirable to achieve ecological or other multiple-use objectives").
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i. The Use of the Best Available Science
The 2005 NFMA planning regulations state that agency planning officials "must
take into account the best available science." 214 The agency's position is that it is
impossible to provide a substantive definition of the "best available science" 215 in a
regulation or directive.2 16 As a result, the agency's approach to describing its
responsibility to take the best available science into account is process-based. The
2005 regulations, amplified by agency directives, 217 describe a four-step discovery
process that, when followed, is supposed to ensure that planners satisfy the
requirement that the best available science be taken into account and that it will
properly influence plan components. 218 For purposes of the planning regulations,
"taking into account the best available science" requires planning officials to
document how the best available science was taken into account in the planning
process, evaluate and disclose substantial scientific uncertainties and substantial
risks associated with plan components based on that science, and document that the
agency appropriately interpreted and applied the science. 21 9 This process of
214. 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a) (2006).
215. The agency has taken a stab at defining the term science, however. According to the
Forest Service Manual:
[s]cience refers to knowledge, information, concepts, methods, and theories
based on organized systems of facts learned from study, observation, and
experience. Science is brought into the planning process through evaluations,
other information gathering, and syntheses. The application of science in
planning provides the Responsible Official with knowledge, methods, and
expert review in order to inform the planning process.
FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 1921.8.
216. Cf Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1194 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006)
("[W]e have not found, nor have the parties cited, any cases that define 'best available
science' in today's context.").
217. National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. 5124,
5124 (Jan. 31, 2006) (emphasis in original). The Forest Service directives consist of the
Forest Service Manual and the Forest Service Handbook, which contain the agency's
policies, practices, and procedures and serve as the primary basis for the internal
management and control of programs and administrative direction to Forest Service
employees. The directives for all agency programs are available electronically at
http://www.fs.fed.us/imldirectives.
218. National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. at
5130.
219. 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(a) (2006). The Forest Service Manual provides a slightly
different description of the four-step process:
The Responsible Official shall demonstrate that the best available science (36
CFR § 219.11) is taken into account during the planning process by using
appropriate procedures including: 1. Timely and comprehensive gathering of
peer-reviewed and other quality-controlled literature, studies, or reports related
to the planning issues. 2. Assessing the information for pertinence based on
objectivity, utility, relevance, and integrity. 3. Synthesizing the pertinent
information for application in the planning process. 4. Based on assumptions
and professional judgment, applying the best available science synthesis to the
2008]
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evaluation and disclosure of uncertainty and risk is designed to "provide a
crosscheck for appropriate interpretation of science and help[ I clarify the
limitations of the information base for the plan. '22 Planners may meet these
requirements by using independent peer review, a science advisory board, or "other
review methods to evaluate the consideration of science in the planning
process. ' ' 22 1 According to the Forest Service, this four-step process "represents the
state-of-the-art for science review for natural resource management."
' 222
Agency planning officials must conduct substantive reviews of the best
available science applied during the planning process. The review process must
include, at a minimum, an assessment of the scientific credibility of the methods
selected and applied to evaluate a plan's components; information gathered and
applied for these evaluations; and synthesis, interpretation, and inferences drawn
from these evaluations. 223 These review procedures are described more fully in the
Forest Service Handbook (FSH). The purpose of the reviews, according to the FSH,
"is to enhance and maximize the quality and credibility of plans and planning
evaluations" and "review how the best available science was taken into account,
not to add to the body of scientific knowledge." 224 A science review, as described
in the FSH, should address four main questions:
1. Has applicable and available scientific information been considered? 2. Has
scientific information been interpreted reasonably and accurately? 3. Are the
uncertainties associated with the scientific information acknowledged and
documented? 4. Have the relevant trends of social, economic, and ecological
resources . . . . including risks and uncertainties, been identified and
documented? 225
planning process, including developing plan components and evaluating plan
outcomes.
FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 215, § 1921.81.
220. National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives, 70 Fed. Reg.1023,
1027 (Jan. 5, 2005).
221. 36 C.F.R. § 219.11(b) (2006).
222. National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. at
5130.
223. FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 215, § 1921.85.
224. FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 212, at § 1909.12, ch. 41.1 ("Science
reviews allow [planners] to document that the best available science was taken into account
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The Forest Service has explained in the Forest Service Manual226 that the "best
available science" may be uncertain due to evolving understandings of social,
economic, and ecological processes and conditions. The sources of uncertainty
identified by the agency include incomplete or conflicting scientific information;
assumptions, interpretation, and extrapolation of information; and predictions of
future trends or conditions. The Manual concedes that some level of uncertainty
will continue to exist even if planning officials comply with their responsibility to
take into account the best available science. It accordingly requires that they
evaluate substantial uncertainty in the best available science by identifying its
sources and assessing how it affects the planning process.
227
The "best available science" mandate of the 2005 planning regulations is a
watered-down version of the proposed planning rules issued by the Forest Service
in 2002. Those rules would have required that agency planning decisions "be
consistent with" the best available science, rather than that planners merely "take
228into account" the best available science. The Forest Service stated in the
preamble to the final regulations that, despite the change in language, "[tihe actual
process for taking into account science in planning has not changed from the 2002
proposed rule., 229 The agency added, however, that science is "only one aspect of
decisionmaking" (albeit a "significant source of information") and that public
input, competing use demands, budget projections, 230 and "many other factors" are
also relevant to planning decisions.23'
226. The Forest Service has described the Forest Service Manual, which forms part of
the agency's "directives," as a document that
contains legal authorities, objectives, policies, responsibilities, instructions, and
guidance needed on a continuing basis by Forest Service line officers and
primary staff to plan and execute programs and activities, while the [Forest
Service Handbook] is generally the principal source of specialized guidance and
instruction for carrying out the policies, objectives, and responsibilities
contained in the [Forest Service Manual].
National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. at 5124.
227. FOREST SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 215, § 1921.82; see also id. § 1921.84
(requiring that planning officials disclose "evaluations of substantial uncertainty and risk in
the plan set of documents" and that the disclosure of uncertainty "include the evidence for
and controversy regarding key assumptions that influence planning outcomes").
228. See National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 67 Fed. Reg.
72,770, 72,802 (proposed Dec. 6, 2002) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)).
229. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1027 (Jan.
5, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219). The agency also asserted that the 2005
regulations "retain[ ] the emphasis in the 2002 proposed rule on the consideration of science
in planning, on documenting how science was interpreted and applied, and on evaluating the
associated risks and uncertainties of using that science." Id. at 1048.
230. According to the Forest Service Manual, "[c]ost should be considered in the
decision of how to apply the best available science in the planning effort." FOREST SERVICE
MANUAL, supra note 215, § 1921.81.
231. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1027; see also
id. at 1048 ("The words 'consistent with' ha[ve] been replaced by 'take into account'
because this term better expresses that formal science is just one source of information for
the Responsible Official and only one aspect of decisionmaking.").
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This open-ended recitation of potentially relevant factors provides ample room
for political factors to override science as the basis for planning decisions without
an acknowledgment by the agency of the actual basis for its decision. At a
minimum, the failure to specify what these "other factors" might be and how they
are supposed to be weighted in comparison to science and other factors in the
decision-making process is likely to hinder the transparency of the planning process
and make it more difficult for interested persons to provide meaningful input. The
agency's decision to shift much of the detailed description of the planning process
requirements from regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulations to the
lesser known agency "directives" (which include the Forest Service Manual and
the Forest Service Handbook) may exacerbate these difficulties. 232
ii. Protection of Diversity
One of the most fundamental alterations that the 2005 NFMA planning
regulations made in the approaches reflected in the 1982 and 2000 regulations
relates to the manner in which they require the Forest Service to monitor, assess,
233
and protect biodiversity. The Forest Service explained in the preamble to the 2005
regulations that, thirty years after the adoption of the NFMA, the concepts of
biological diversity at different spatial and temporal scales (including genetic,
species, structural, and functional diversity) have been substantially refined.234 The
complexity of the concept of biological diversity, according to the agency, requires
"a corresponding complicated array of concepts, measures, and values from several
scientific disciplines. 235 The Forest Service settled as its foundational principle
that "maintenance of the diversity of plant and animal communities starts with an
ecosystem approach," which seeks to "provide a framework for maintaining and
restoring ecosystem conditions necessary to conserve most species., 236 The more
232. The Forest Service stated in the preamble to the 2005 regulations that:
[T]he final rule does not include many of the specific analytical processes and
requirements set out in the 2002 proposed rule. Appropriate processes will be
included in the Forest Service directives. The Department believes it is more
appropriate to put specific procedural analytical requirements in the Forest
Service directives rather than in the rule itself so that the analytical procedures
can be changed more rapidly if new and better techniques emerge. As for other
portions of the Forest Service directives, public notice and comment is required
where there is substantial public interest or controversy.
Id. at 1028. The agency also defended this shift on the ground that the "directives can be
more extensive and can be more easily changed as the agency learns how to improve its
analytic processes and as new scientific concepts and new technological capabilities become
available." Id. at 1029.
233. "In the most general sense, ecological risk assessment involves estimating the
likelihood that an identified hazard will have a negative effect, and estimating the ecological
consequences of that negative effect." GARY K. MEFFE, C. RONALD CARROLL &
CONTRIBUTORS, PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 376 (2d ed. 1997).
234. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1028.
235. Id.
236. Id.; see also id. at 1047-48 ("[E]cosystem diversity framework provides an essential
ecological context and identifies the unique contributions that NFS lands can make to the
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effective a plan is in protecting ecosystem diversity "the less need there is for
species-specific analysis." 237 Accordingly, it is only when Forest Service planners
determine that the ecosystem approach fails to provide an adequate framework for
maintaining and restoring conditions to support species listed under the ESA,
species-of-concern, and species-of-interest that the plan must include additional
provisions for those species. 238 LRMPs should provide "measures for accounting
for progress toward ecosystem and species diversity goals .... Progress toward
desired conditions and objectives will be monitored and the results made available
to the public. The adaptive monitoring and feedback process will help maintain and
improve diversity. 2 39
In marked contrast to the 1982 regulations2'm and the 2002 proposed
regulations,2 41 the 2005 planning regulations do not require that the Forest Service
provide for viable populations of plant and animal species. The Forest Service
provided three principal explanations for this omission. First, the agency concluded
based on experience "that ensuring species viability is not always possible" due to
problems such as species-specific distribution problems, declines in species due to
factors beyond the agency's control, or the inability of available land to support
species. 242 Second, NFS units contain "very large" numbers of recognized species,
three elements of sustainability.").
237. Id. at 1048.
238. Id. at 1028; see also National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives,
71 Fed. Reg. 5124, 5137 (Jan. 31, 2006) (stating that the 2005 planning rule "stipulates that
the species diversity approach is to be used when the components set up through ecosystem
diversity need to be supplemented to provide appropriate ecological conditions for listed
species, species-of-concern, and species-of-interest"); FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra
note 212, § 1909.12, ch. 43.25. The Forest Service Handbook states that:
As a rule, provisions in plan components for conservation of species should
focus first on providing appropriate amounts and distribution of suitable habitat
throughout the plan area over time. Only where a broad-scale ecosystem
diversity framework will not provide appropriate ecological conditions for
listed species, species-of-concern, and species-of-interest, should small spatial
scales be considered or analyzed.
Id. The Forest Service characterized its approach as "a complementary ecosystem and
species diversity approach for ecological sustainability." National Forest System Land
Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1029.
A 2006 report issued by the H. John Heinz Center for Science, Economics and the
Environment identified ten key information gaps that prevent effective reporting on key
indicators of the condition and use of U.S. ecosystems. The ten data gaps related to both
species and ecosystem health. See THE H. JOHN HEINz CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, FILLING THE GAPS: PRIORITY DATA NEEDS AND KEY MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL REPORTING ON ECOSYSTEM CONDITION 21 (2006), available at
http://www.heinzctr.org/publications.shtml.
239. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1028; see also
Seidman & Burdin, supra note 152, at 43 (stating that the 2005 regulations "recognize that
the planning process should include monitoring of progress toward ecosystem and species
diversity").
240. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (2000); see supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
241. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1029
(describing "Option 1" of the proposed rule).
242. Id.
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and the Forest Service found it "clearly impractical" to analyze all those species. 24 3
Further, "previous attempts to analyze the full suite of species via groups,
surrogates, and representatives have had mixed success in practice.''244 Third, the
agency's past focus on the viability requirement diverted attention and resources
away from an ecosystem-based approach to land management, which the Forest
Service now considers to be "the most efficient and effective way to manage for the
broadest range of species with the limited resources available for the task.1
245
Similarly, the 2005 planning regulations do not impose any requirements that
LRMPs dictate population monitoring. The Forest Service explained that
population data are difficult to obtain and evaluate due to factors beyond the
agency's control that affect populations.
The Department believes that it is best to focus the agency's monitoring
program on habitat on NFS land where the agency can adjust management to
meet the needs of certain species. Desired conditions are often a focus of the
monitoring program. The agency will identify species-of-concern and species-
of-interest .... Where ecological conditions for these species are identified as
desired conditions, the habitat could be monitored to assist in avoiding future
listing of these species. 2"
The regulations do not prohibit population monitoring, and the agency may require
it in as-yet undefined "appropriate" circumstances. 247 But Forest Service directives
issued after the 2005 planning regulations take the position that, "[flor most
species, the only practical quantitative evaluation is assessment of habitat
conditions."
248
More specifically, the 2005 regulations scrap both the MIS monitoring
requirements imposed by the 1982 regulations and eliminate the provisions of the
2000 regulations relating to focal species. 24 9 In response to comments on the
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The Forest Service explained that, although "[tihe viability standard will no
longer be used," Forest Service directives that elaborate on the 2005 planning regulations
will continue to require that planners identify listed species, species-of-concern, and species-
of-interest; collect available data and information for those species, including population
data; develop management direction for the species; and assess the effects of management
actions. National Forest System Land Management Planning Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. 5124,
5138 (Jan. 31, 2006).
246. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1029.
247. Id.
248. FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 212, § 1909.12, ch. 43.26; see also
Seidman & Burdin, supra note 152, at 42 ("Instead of wasting valuable agency resources on
the impractical task of attempting to inventory all species or even representative indicator
species, the Service has recognized that healthy and diverse ecosystems are the best indicator
of healthy wildlife populations.").
249. The regulations contain special provisions applicable to NFS units governed by
plans developed under the 1982 planning rules. Planning officials may meet MIS obligations
by considering data and analysis related to habitat, unless the plan specifically requires
population monitoring or population surveys. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(f) (2006); National Forest
System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1052. The Forest Service explained:
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proposed rule suggesting that the final rule impose survey and monitoring
requirements for MIS or focal species, the Forest Service explained that it chose
not to require MIS monitoring because "recent scientific evidence identified flaws
in the MIS concept." 250 According to the agency, that evidence refuted the notion
that population trends for certain species could serve as surrogates for other
species.25
The Forest Service also rejected the concept of focal species initially proposed
by the Committee of Scientists and adopted in the 2000 planning regulations based
on its conclusion that that concept "is untested and it would not be prudent to
potentially make the same mistake with focal species as was made with MIS in the
1982 planning rule. 252 The agency conceded, however, that the premise that focal
species can serve "as indicators of the ecological conditions may have merit" and
stated that Forest Service directives might use focal species "as a tool to identify
monitoring approaches to assess progress towards achieving the desired condition
articulated in a plan."
253
The Forest Service directives, issued subsequent to the 2005 planning
regulations, state that it is important to identify species listed under the ESA,
species-of-concern, and species-of-interest that are present in the plan area and
gather existing information about them. One directive provides:
However, in many cases it will be impractical to consider each species
individually in the planning process. Therefore, the Responsible Official may
identify a manageable subset of species on which to focus species conservation
measures and evaluation in the plan, plan amendment, or plan revision. For this
Providing explicitly for MIS monitoring flexibility will allow for monitoring of
habitat conditions as a surrogate for population trend data. It is appropriate for a
range of methods to be available to estimate, or approximate, population trends
for MIS. The Responsible Official will determine which monitoring method or
combination of monitoring methods to use for a given MIS.
Id. Even when planning officials decide to conduct actual population monitoring for MIS,
the preamble to the 2005 regulations expresses a preference for using a sampling program
instead of a total enumeration. Id.; see Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d
866, 881 (D. Ariz. 2006) (confirming that, under section 219.14(f), the Forest Service has
"the option to utilize habitat data as to any obligation regarding MIS"), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, and remanded, 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007).
250. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048. The
Forest Service added:
Other tools can often be useful and more appropriate in predicting the effects of
projects that implement a land management plan (such as examining the effect
of proposed activities on the habitat of specific species); using information
identified, obtained, or developed through a variety of methods (such as
assessments, analysis, and monitoring results); or using information obtained
from other sources (such as State fish and wildlife agencies and organizations
like The Nature Conservancy).
Id. at 1052.
251. Id. at 1048 (stating that through time, it "was found not to be the case" that






purpose, species groups and/or surrogate species may be used as an evaluation
and analysis tool to improve planning efficiency and for development of plan
components. When groups of species have been identified, one or more species
within each group may be selected to serve as surrogates for the ecological
condition for other species in the group, or surrogate species may be selected
based on other concepts such as umbrella species, keystone species, ecological
indicators, and so forth. If species groups and/or surrogate species are used,
clearly describe the process for identifying groups or surrogates including
critical assumptions and the uncertainty of conclusions. Explain why
assumptions are reasonable and why the degree of uncertainty is acceptable.
Identification and use of surrogate species is strictly an analysis and evaluation
tool that may be used to improve planning efficiency.
254
Even when surrogates are used in the manner described in the directive, however,
"rt]here are no population monitoring or inventory requirements for surrogate
species." 255 Before it issued the final directives that expand upon the 2005 planning
regulations, the Forest Service was urged by commentators to identify criteria for
identifying surrogate species and to describe how this tool will be used in the forest
planning process. 256 The Agency's response was simply that, "[a]s with any other
approach used in NFMA planning, species grouping and the selection of surrogates
must take into account the best available science and applicable portions of the
Data Quality Act (44 U.S.C. 3516). An approach that does not satisfy these criteria
would not be used.,
2 57
In short, the 2005 planning regulations as well as the directives subsequently
issued by the Forest Service neither "anticipate gathering population data for
developing a plan," specify the types of data needed to implement LRMPs, nor
prescribe any requirements for monitoring of any resource. Instead, "[tihe types
and amount of data needed will be determined by [planning officials] taking into
account best available science., 258 In deciding what resources to monitor and in
selecting the methods for doing so, the Agency has indicated that it intends to
afford priority to circumstances that present "a high degree of uncertainty
associated with management assumptions."
259
254. FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 212, § 1909.12, ch. 43.24 (emphasis
added). The directive also explains that "one or more species within each macrohabitat group
may be selected as surrogates if they can be demonstrated to represent the ecological
conditions for all species in the group" and that "[i]f the needs of surrogate species are met,
then most needs of other species within the habitat group should also be met." Id.
255. Id.
256. The commentators argued that if workable guidelines for forest planners could not
be developed, the entire section should be deleted from the final regulations. National Forest
System Land Management Planning Directives, 71 Fed. Reg. 5124, 5141 (Jan. 31, 2006).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 5137 (emphasis added).
259. Id. (quoting FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 212, § 1909.12, ch. 12.1).
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iii. Evaluation of the 2005 Planning Regulations
The 2005 planning regulations depart from the rules that governed NFMA
planning from 1982 to 2000 and from the 2000 planning rules, had they ever gone
into effect, in several significant ways relevant to the implementation of the
NFMA's diversity requirement. First, the regulations provide equal emphasis on
the social, economic, and ecological components of sustainability, whereas the
2000 regulations clearly identified restoration and maintenance of ecological
sustainability as the preeminent goal of the NFMA planning process.
Second, they represent a marked shift from a mandate that planning officials
assess the consequences of management actions at both the ecosystem and species
levels. Although the 2005 regulations do not ignore species diversity, the default
rule is that protection of ecosystem diversity will serve as an adequate mechanism
for protecting species diversity as well. Planning officials must adopt mechanisms
to provide specific protection for species-of-concern or species-of-interest only if
they conclude that particular conditions in the planning area make it impossible for
protection of ecosystem diversity to also achieve the goal of species diversity.
Third, the 2005 regulations eliminate the viability requirement contained in the
1982 regulations. According to the Forest Service, the species viability requirement
diverted the agency's attention away from the more important task of protecting
diversity at the ecosystem level. In addition, it was burdensome for planners to
monitor the effect of management actions on a large number of species, and the
effort resulted in "mixed success" at any rate. As two observers have indicated, the
2005 planning regulations reflect the Forest Service's attempt
to resolve the habitat-based versus population-based wildlife management
dilemma by abandoning the "species viability" approach and by selecting the
goal of maintaining or enhancing ecosystem diversity as "the primary means by
which a [forest] plan contributes to sustaining ecological systems" to provide
for diversity of plant and animal communities. The agency asserts that the more
effectively it maintains the ecosystem, the less it will need to analyze and plan
at the "species level of ecological organization." 26
It is not clear, however, whether the 2005 planning regulations install sufficient
monitoring or evaluation requirements to provide a meaningful check in the context
of particular decisions on the accuracy of the agency's assumption that protection
of diversity at the ecosystem level will suffice to insure the protection of species-
level diversity as well.26'
260. Seidman & Burdin, supra note 152, at 42 (citation omitted).
261. See Jeffrey Rudd, The Forest Service's Epistemic Judgments: Enhancing
Transparency to Ensure "New Knowledge" Informs Agency Decision-Making Processes, 23
TEMP. ENvTL. L. & TECH. J. 145, 198 (2004) (asserting that "[in the absence of an
assessment of species diversity, the agency will be unable to determine whether ecosystem
level diversity provides the degree of species diversity protection necessary to maintain a
sustainable ecological system" and urging the Forest Service to "conduct species level




Fourth, consistent with the Forest Service's focus on ecosystem as opposed to
species diversity, the 2005 regulations eliminate the requirement that planning
officials engage in population monitoring of any kind, although they permit such
monitoring to be conducted under individual plans. The regulations abandon the
concept of MIS because "recent scientific evidence identified flaws in the MIS
concept" as a method for using limited information to predict the consequences of
management actions on the forest as a whole.262 The regulations also back away
from the designation of focal species, which were an important component of the
2000 regulations, because the Forest Service deems the concept to be untested and
imprudent.
The 2005 regulations, however, do not abandon the technique of using surrogate
components of the resources in the plan area to simulate the effect of management
actions on the broader ecosystem. On the one hand, the Forest Service justified
throwing out the use of MIS on the ground that recent scientific evidence refuted
the premise that population trends for individual species can serve as surrogates for
the trends of other species.263 On the other hand, because it is impractical to
consider each species individually in the planning process, the Forest Service
directives permit planners to identify a "manageable subset of species on which to
focus species conservation measures and evaluation in the plan" and to use species
groups or surrogate species as evaluative and analytical tools. 264 It is not clear why
the Forest Service believes that such techniques will provide useful information,
even assuming that the agency provides forthright descriptions of the uncertainties
involved in the selection of the surrogates, 65 if the premise that tracking population
trends for surrogate species can simulate trends for the ecosystem in which they
live has been found "not to be the case."
266
A particularly troublesome component of the new approach to reliance on
surrogates is the statement contained in Forest Service directives that, in selecting
surrogates, Forest Service personnel must take into account not only the best
available science, but also "applicable portions of the Data Quality Act" (also
known as the Information Quality Act (IQA)).267 That statute requires that all
federal agencies comply with guidelines issued by the Office of Management and
Budget to ensure and maximize "the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of
information (including statistical information) disseminated by federal
agenc[ies]. '265 The IQA has served as a tool by which those opposed to the
imposition of environmental protection measures have sought to delay
implementation of those measures and to censor information with which they
262. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048.
263. Id.
264. FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 212, § 1909.12, ch. 43.24.
265. One observer, however, has expressed a fear that due to "[t]he inherent limitations in
the process of producing scientific knowledge[,] . . . Forest Service administrators will
justify as 'scientific' claims that mask the level of uncertainty recognized by the broader
scientific community." Rudd, supra note 261, at 165.
266. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1048.
267. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-153-54 (2000) (codified at 44
U.S.C. § 3516 (2000)).
268. Id.
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disagree or which they would rather not be disseminated because of its potential to
put their activities in a bad light. The IQA has become a basis for challenging
agency efforts to protect the public health and the environment by casting decisions
made despite the existence of scientific uncertainty as decisions based on "bad
science., 269 Scientific uncertainty is a pervasive attribute of environmental
regulation, and its existence does not necessarily reflect unsubstantiated decisions
or decisions based on unsound science. 270 The incorporation of IQA procedures
into the NFMA process for protecting biodiversity appears to be a prescription for
imposing shackles on efforts by the Forest Service to use the planning process to
impose new constraints on resource extraction activities or other uses with the
potential to interfere with the restoration or protection of biodiversity. 27'
Moreover, the Forest Service has not abandoned the use of surrogates as
predictors of the effects of management actions on biodiversity. Rather, it has
redefined the surrogate. Instead of assessing the impact of management actions on
individual or focal species to determine whether the actions will frustrate the
statutory requirements of protecting plant and animal diversity, the Forest Service
has chosen in most cases to proceed on the basis of the assumption that assessing
the impact of management actions on species habitat, and taking measures to
protect that habitat, will enable planners to comply with the NFMA mandate that
plant and animal diversity be protected through the planning process. The Forest
Service has thus resorted to the proxy-on-proxy approach it began using under the
1982 regulations when it concluded that the monitoring of MIS was too
burdensome. The substitution of the proxy-on-proxy approach for the MIS-based
approach is problematic. Despite ongoing debate over how to define a species, 272 it
269. Sidney A. Shapiro, Rena Steinzor & Margaret Clune, Ossifying Ossification: Why
the Information Quality Act Should Not Provide for Judicial Review, Center for Progressive
Reform White Paper 601 (Feb. 2006), at 2-3, available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/ articles/CPRIQA_601.pdf.
270. Sidney A. Shapiro, The Data Quality Appropriations Rider: New Procedures and
Information Disclosure, Center for Progressive Reform Perspective Series (2005) (arguing
that there is a "crucial distinction between incomplete data and poor quality data"), available
at http://www.progressivereform.org/perspectives/dataQuality.cfm.
271. Cf Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB's Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,064 (2004) (arguing that the IQA creates a procedural apparatus that is likely to stifle the
government's efforts to provide useful information to the public about their safety and health
risks and about risks to the environment). See generally Stephen M. Johnson, Junking the
'Junk Science' Law: Reforming the Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 37 (2006);
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Information Quality Act and Environmental Protection: The Perils
of Reform by Appropriations Rider, 28 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 339 (2004);
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Case Against the IQA, ENvTL. F., July/Aug. 2005, at 26; Michelle V.
Lacko, Comment, The Data Quality Act: Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L.J.
305 (2004).
272. Anna L. George & Richard L. Mayden, Species Concepts and the Endangered
Species Act: How a Valid Biological Definition of Species Enhances the Legal Protection of
Biodiversity, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 369, 369 (2005) ("There is no single accepted definition
of a 'species' in the natural sciences."); J.B. Ruhl, The Battle over Endangered Species Act
Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 576 n.67 (2004) ("The scientific consensus on 'species' ...
is that no complete consensus exists and that different definitions suit different purposes")
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may be even more difficult for scientists to agree on the definition of an ecosystem
and on how to measure its vitality. 273 The more abstract the measurement chosen to
represent plant and animal diversity within a forest, the more likely it is that
agencies can base management decisions on undisclosed value judgments rather
than falsifiable scientific hypotheses. The status of the habitat of an MIS appears
less concrete than a specification of the rise or fall in MIS populations.
Fifth, the regulations introduce the concept of planning based upon a vague,
process-based "best available science" mandate. The regulations require that
planners identify scientific uncertainty and how it might affect planning decisions.
Although the 2002 proposed regulations would have required planners to base their
decisions on the best available science, the final regulations only require that the
agency "take into account" the best available science, and the Forest Service has
acknowledged that science provides only one of many factors upon which it will
make its planning decisions. There is nothing inherently wrong with a process-
based approach to the protection of biodiversity. There is also merit, as discussed
below,274 to the idea that the Forest Service maintain flexibility in its efforts to
protect biodiversity so that it can respond quickly and effectively to changes in the
state of scientific knowledge. Both the use of a procedure-based definition of
diversity and the movement into agency directives of most of the detailed
prescriptions, substantive and procedural, for protecting biodiversity in the NFMA
planning process, are designed to achieve that freedom to respond to circumstances
as they develop.
The Forest Service Manual and the Forest Service Handbook are likely to be
less accessible than agency regulations, however, and some people interested in
Forest Service management may not even know about them. 275 If the agency's
decisions are being guided by standards and procedures shielded from public view,
efforts to provide meaningful input into Forest Service planning decisions may be
frustrated.276 That result seems contrary to the spirit if not the letter of what the
statute demands of the agency. It requires the Forest Service to "provide for public
participation" in the development of LRMPs,2 7 and it provides that, in exercising
his or her authority under the NFMA, the Secretary of Agriculture establish
procedures to give the public adequate notice of and opportunity to comment on the
(quoting Blake Hood, Transgenic Salmon and the Definition of "Species" Under the
Endangered Species Act, 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 78 (2002)).
273. Susan Harrison, Biodiversity and Wilderness: The Need for Systematic Protection of
Biological Diversity, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 53, 56 (2005) ("Academic ecology
is full of unresolved debates, however, over the degree to which communities or ecosystems
are real entities with objectively definable boundaries and in what ways their functional
properties depend on their component species."); cf Kristin Carden, Bridging the Divide:
The Role of Science in Species Conservation Law, 30 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 165, 216 (2006)
("[E]ven given unlimited time, the complex, diverse, and dynamic nature of ecosystems does
not lend itself to our full understanding.").
274. See infra notes 313-21 and accompanying text.
275. The directives are accessible through the Forest Service's official website, at
http://www.fs.fed.us/in/directives.
276. Cf Rudd, supra note 261, at 164 (asserting that "the regulations shield from view
the scientific process of knowledge production and its relationship to the Service's
responsibility to honor that process").
277. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (2000).
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formulation of standards and criteria applicable to Forest Service programs.178 It is
hard enough for interested members of the public to provide informed and useful
input when the issues are as technical as they typically are in determining the
appropriate framework for approving management actions involving forest lands
and resources. It is harder still for such persons to play the role Congress
envisioned for them if the decisions are governed by criteria that are not readily
available.
The barriers to informed participation in Forest Service planning efforts may
even reduce the utility of input from the scientific community outside the agency,
particularly in light of the possibility that the agency may not be receptive to
interpretations of the "available" science that conflict with its own. 27 9 The Forest
Service did not even convene a committee of scientists before promulgating the
2005 regulations, in contrast to the practices followed in the development of both
the 1982 and the 2000 planning regulations, 280 and in apparent violation of the
NFMA's requirement that the agency convene and solicit input from a committee
as part of the process of implementing the planning process.
281
Far more worrisome than the accessibility of these directives, however, is their
legal status. Although the courts have reacted differently when asked to
characterize the status of Forest Service directives, some cases support the
conclusion that the FSM and the FSH lack the force and effect of law, are not
binding upon the agency, and cannot be enforced by private litigants in suits
against the Forest Service. The Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded that the FSM
"does not rise to the status of a regulation" and evidently need not be followed by
the agency.28 2 The courts have reached similar results in assessing the status of the
278. Id. § 1612(a).
279. Rudd charges that
one of the fundamental problems with the Forest Service's reliance upon
"science" to justify its management decisions [is that the] present institutional
relationship between the Forest Service and the remainder of the scientific
community fails to ensure "equality of intellectual authority among qualified
practitioners." The Forest Service's choice of a "scientific" claim, theory, or
technique over a conflicting knowledge claim results from an epistemic
judgment about the relative values of the competing claims to address the
problem at hand. The Service is not required to support its judgment with direct
appeal to the broader scientific community's views concerning the knowledge
claims' soundness.
Rudd, supra note 261, at 179 (quoting HELEN E. LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE:
VALUES OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 134 (1990)).
280. See Flournoy et al., supra note 185, at 3-5 (describing the input provided by the
committees convened prior to issuance of the 1982 and 2000 regulations).
281. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) provides that, in carrying out the purposes of § 1604(g),
which requires the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations governing the
planning process, the Secretary "shall appoint a committee of scientists who are not officers
or employees of the Forest Service."
282. Hi-Ridge Lumber Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 452, 454-55 (9th Cir. 1971); see
also Big Meadows Grazing Ass'n v. United States, 344 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 2003); Sw.
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996); Hage
v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 570, 585 (2002) (stating that agency manuals lack "the force of
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FSH.283 If the Forest Service directives do not bind the agency in its NFMA
planning decisions, the 2005 regulations have moved in the direction of vesting in
the agency relatively unconstrained discretion in deciding how to implement the
NFMA's diversity mandate, particularly given the vagueness and brevity
(compared to the 1982 and 2000 planning regulations) of the regulations
themselves concerning what the agency is required to do to restore and maintain
plant and animal diversity. This move toward decreased accountability is
regrettable. 284 Finally, the directives provide little solace in that they state at one
point that the agency's assessment of ecosystem diversity should "inform" planning
decisions, rather than that the assessment will determine, or even play a significant
role in determining, the outcome of the planning process.
285
The degree to which the 2005 planning regulations conform to or deviate from
the NFMA's dictate that LRMPs be developed in a manner that provides for the
diversity of plant and animal communities probably will be decided in the crucible
of litigation. The regulations did not settle the controversy over whether the statute
mandates a species-based protection effort or allows the Forest Service to focus on
habitat maintenance. Likewise, the policy debate has not been stilled. 286
Environmental groups sued the Forest Service, challenging the validity of the 2005
regulations on both substantive and procedural grounds.287 In the first round of
litigation, a federal district court in California enjoined implementation of the 2005
regulations and remanded to the agency. 288 The court instructed the Forest Service
to comply with notice and comment rulemaking procedures set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act, the environmental assessment requirements of
NEPA, and the consultation requirements of the ESA. The Forest Service
contravened all of these provisions in issuing the regulations. 289 The court did not
address the substantive validity of the regulations, including the provisions bearing
law").
283. See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council, 148 F.3d 1231, 1243 n. 11 (1 lth Cir.
1998); see also W. Radio Serv. Co. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
neither the Forest Service Manual nor the Forest Service Handbook has the independent
force and effect of law because they are not substantive in nature, are not promulgated in
accordance with the procedures specified in the Administrative Procedure Act, and are not
issued pursuant to an independent grant of congressional authority); City of Williams v.
Dombeck, 151 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22 (D.D.C. 2001) (concluding that neither the FSM nor the
FSH is mandatory because they were never published in the Code of Federal Regulations).
284. See infra notes 321-28 for a discussion of the importance of agency accountability
in the use of models or other surrogate simulations.
285. FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 212, § 1909.12, ch. 43.1.
286. Seidman & Burdin, supra note 152, at 44 (asserting that the 2005 regulations
"appear to have simply fanned the flames of the controversy over forest wildlife
management strategies").
287. The claims raised by the plaintiffs include allegations that the Forest Service
violated applicable notice and comment rulemaking requirements, improperly failed to
include adequate decision-making standards regarding wildlife protection, failed to support
its decision to "abandon" the species viability requirement, and violated NEPA by refusing
to prepare an environmental impact statement on the regulations. See id.
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on the Forest Service's responsibility under the NFMA to protect plant and animal
diversity.
III. A GENERIC SET OF CRITERIA FOR MANAGING BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY THROUGH MODELING AND THE USE OF SURROGATES
The controversy over the Forest Service's evolving approaches to fulfilling its
responsibility under the NFMA to protect biodiversity provides an opportunity to
assess what a regulatory program for making science-based decisions in the face of
scientific uncertainty should look like. This Part of the Article argues that such a
regulatory program should be realistic, collaborative, transparent, and flexible. In
addition, a regulatory program should install mechanisms for insuring that the
agency responsible for implementing the program may be held accountable.
The necessity of making environmental and natural resource management policy
decisions despite the presence of considerable scientific uncertainty about the need
for and effects of such decisions will not disappear any time soon. As the stakes of
waiting until all of the "necessary" information is available get higher in resolving
issues, such as how to combat global climate change, the need to make expeditious
but informed decisions before the decision maker has eliminated doubt only grows
stronger.29° Therefore, agencies responsible for restraining the potentially harmful
activities of industrial and governmental polluters and for acting as stewards of
publicly owned resources, and the legislatures that delegate decision-making
authority to such agencies, must avoid falling into the trap of believing that there is
"an" optimal answer to a particular environmental policy problem, and that if we
wait long enough, science will provide us with the information necessary to
ascertain what that answer is and then allow us to put it into effect. Uncertainty can
easily be used, and unfortunately has been in many environmental policy debates in
the past, as "an excuse for inactivity, citing that 'more research is needed before a
sound decision is made.' 291 Bounded rationality is here to stay. The task at hand is
not eliminating it, but reducing it to manageable proportions through research and
the use of simulation techniques, such as modeling, so that reasonably informed
judgments can be made about the relative merits of the competing alternative policy
choices.
290. Rose, supra note 1, at 294 (arguing that "more than ever, policymakers cannot wait
until scientific evidence is conclusive; instead, they often have to make up their minds while
the data is still tentative").
291. Eric Wolanski, Robert Richmond, Laurence McCook & Hugh Sweatman, Mud,
Marine Snow and Coral Reefs, 91 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 44, 51 (2003). The authors, who
made this comment in discussing ecosystem models, assert that "the major impediment at
this point appears to be political will." Id. Cf Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Evans, 364
F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1131-32 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (criticizing agency subject to mandate to make
decisions based on the "best available science" for characterizing new study as "junk
science" as a pretext for ignoring it), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oceana, Inc. v. Gutierrez,
457 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2006); Earth Island Inst. v. Hogarth, 484 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (9th
Cir. 2007) (concluding that agency's finding that yellowfin tuna fishery was not having an
adverse impact on dolphin populations, which was supposed to be based solely on the best
available science under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and was couched in those terms,
was instead improperly influenced by international political concerns).
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Environmental agencies will continue to rely on models-the dose-response
assessment models that permit extrapolation of animal test data on toxic chemicals
down to the levels of likely human exposure, or the identification of MIS or focal
species to serve as surrogates for the effect of the management alternatives being
considered on the larger ecosystem of which they are a part-to help them close the
data gaps they face in making policy judgments. In doing so, they should be careful
not to cordon themselves off from those who might provide useful input on the
potential flaws in their modeling exercises and on the availability of alternative
means of managing bounded rationality.292 Agencies can isolate themselves either
by making their decisions in secret, without soliciting the views of knowledgeable
experts and lay persons, or by framing the debate in terms that are so technical that
the world of potentially useful contributors becomes extremely small.
By combating this tendency and welcoming rather than dreading the possibility
that other experts have insights not yet developed by agency scientists, the agency
provides itself with an opportunity to reduce the level of uncertainty surrounding its
decision. Indeed, the "best available science" standard contained in the 2005
regulations is fully consistent with the idea that agencies should reach out for
expert advice if it is interpreted as imposing on the agency an affirmative obligation
to make reasonable efforts (but not efforts so onerous as to cripple the agency's
ability to act within a reasonable time frame) to supplement the existing knowledge
base.293
There is some evidence that at least one court has begun to adopt a similar
approach in assessing the Forest Service's compliance with the 2005 regulations. In
an NFMA-based challenge to the validity of a logging project governed by the
"best available science" mandate, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
finding that the Forest Service complied with the statute and regulations and
remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the Forest Service's
292. According to a critic of the 2005 planning regulations:
Although models may serve an important instrumental purpose, and "case
studies may provide the best approach to applied ecology," both approaches are
subject to the influence of bias and assumption. Theoretical models'
assumptions risk the loss of specific knowledge about a particular ecosystem or
species in an attempt to demonstrate "exceptionless laws." Case-studies'
background assumptions may sacrifice general knowledge transferable across
study areas in favor of detailed, local knowledge claims.
Rudd, supra note 261, at 207 (quoting Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Earl McCoy, Applied
Ecology and the Logic of Case Studies, 61:2 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 230 (1994)); see also
ORRIN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY-JARvIS, USELESS ARIrHMETIC: WHY ENVIRONMENTAL
SCIENTISTS CAN'T PREDICT THE FuTURE (2007) (contending that mathematical models used
to make scientific determinations yield results that depart from reality due to factors such as
erroneous assumptions and the reluctance to check predictions against natural outcomes).
293. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that Congress
imposes "best available science" mandates as a means of requiring such affirmative,
information-gathering efforts); see also Doremus, supra note 32, at 444 (urging both
agencies and courts to "return to the earlier interpretation that section 7 [of the ESA]
imposes an obligation on the action agency to provide any reasonably obtainable
information").
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approval of the project. 294 The Forest Service asserted that it followed the best
available science, contending that it had the discretion to decide what constitutes
the best available science.295 The court rejected that claim, however, concluding
instead that the 2005 regulations "underscore that the 'best available science' is not
just whatever the Forest Service finds on the shelf." 296 The court was troubled by
the Forest Service's selective reliance on a 1992 Forest Service report and in
particular its contention that the court was obliged to defer to the agency's expertise
whenever its conclusions differed from those in the report. 297 The court invalidated
the logging project because, on the record before it, it was unable to determine
whether the Forest Service satisfied the best available science mandate. It suggested
that, on remand, the Forest Service look to the practice of agencies governed by
other statutes-the ESA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery and Conservation and Management Act-that require agencies to base their
decisions on the best available science.298 The court read the cases and regulations
interpreting those other statutes as clearly absolving the Forest Service of the need
to collect new data; the court instead read the statutes to require that the Forest
Service "seek out and collect all existing scientific evidence relevant to the
decision" and prohibit it from ignoring existing data. 299 Notably, it also established
that "the best available politics does not equate to the best available science."
3 °°
The Tenth Circuit subsequently invalidated timber sales in two additional cases
based on the Forest Service's noncompliance with the best available science
mandate. In one case, the court concluded that the agency provided no evidence
that it used the best available science in approving the project.30' In the other, the
court found it "obvious" that the agency did not satisfy its obligations to base
approval of the logging project on the best available scientific evidence, and
rejected the district court's conclusion that the error was harmless due to the
agency's reliance on other available data. 30 2 The administrative record contained no
indication that the Forest Service ever considered its best available science
obligations before approving the timber sales.303 These precedents may presage a
refusal on the part of the courts to rubber-stamp the Forest Service's findings on
whether individual projects were properly based on the best available science.
The fear that agency scientists will close themselves off from the potentially
conflicting views of experts on the outside is apparently a legitimate one in the
294. Ecology Ctr. v. U. S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).
295. Id. at 1193.
296. Id. (emphasis added).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1194 n.4.
299. Id. at 1194-95 n.4 (quoting Heartwood, Inc. v. U. S. Forest Serv., 380 F.3d 428, 436
(8th Cir. 2004)).
300. Id. at 1194 n.4 (quoting Midwater Trawlers Co-Op. v. Dep't of Commerce, 282 F.3d
710, 720 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)).
301. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1135-37 (10th Cir. 2007).
302. Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F.3d 1269, 1287 (10th Cir. 2007). Interestingly,
the court noted that the Forest Service "relied solely on MIS-based analysis in approving
these three projects." Id.
303. Id. at 1288.
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context of decision making to preserve biodiversity. According to one account,
"[o]ver the last 50 years, it appears that sections of the wildlife discipline have
developed a certain subculture that is not inclined to release strategic wildlife and
habitat data on which decisions are based.,, 304 The NFMA provides at least two
concrete mechanisms for combating any tendency of agency scientists to cut
themselves off from potentially dissenting views. First, as indicated above, the
statute requires the Secretary of Agriculture to convene and seek input from a
Committee of Scientists when the Forest Service embarks on the process of
amending the planning regulations. 30 5 Second, the statute requires that, in providing
for public participation in the planning for and management of the national forests,
the Secretary "shall establish and consult such advisory boards as he deems
necessary to secure full information and advice on the execution of his
responsibilities." 30 6 Those boards must reflect a cross-section of groups interested
in planning and management decisions governing the use and enjoyment of the
national forests. 30 7 The Forest Service should scrupulously follow these solicitation
requirements, and other environmental and natural resource management agencies
should likewise create or take advantage of procedures that allow them to
collaborate with experts outside the agency before deciding how to narrow the
relevant data gaps that seem to pose obstacles to informed policy judgments. As
one critic of the 2005 planning regulations has argued:
The objectivity of the science-based judgments required by the "best available
science" regulation will only be established through interactive discourse
between the agency and the broader scientific community; i.e., through the
process of "transformative criticism." Scientific "consistency checks" will limit
the introduction of arbitrary or subjective preferences undermining the
scientific knowledge production process and its reasonable impact on Forest
Service planning decisions.
30 8
He adds that "the influence of bias and authoritarian tendencies will only be
prevented by transparent and collaborative decision-making processes."
3°9
Agencies making science-based decisions in the face of bounded rationality
must reach out to more than just the scientific experts. Although scientific
information is no doubt essential to an agency's ability to make resource allocation
decisions such as the ones at issue in the NFMA planning process, these decisions
"cannot be divorced from underlying value-based considerations, including related
political, economic, social, and aesthetic judgments," especially when, as is often
the case, scientific debate precludes the technical experts from settling upon a
304. Huettmann, supra note 67, at 470.
305. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (2000).
306. Id. § 1612(b).
307. Id.
308. Rudd, supra note 261, at 186. In particular, Rudd argues that the Forest Service
must "(1) develop standards for reviewing relevant claims produced by the broader scientific
community, and (2) design collaborative processes involving non-agency scientists to
establish through transformative criticism the credibility of the agency's science-based
positions." Id. at 186-87 (internal citations removed).
309. Id. at 187.
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single, right answer.310 The solicitation of input from all interested members of the
public, including but not limited to those subject to environmental regulation and
those seeking permission to use public resources, is essential to the making of
informed judgments on those extra-scientific questions.
Unless the agency explains its options in terms accessible to non-experts, it
cannot hope to receive useful input on questions, such as whether to monitor
wildlife habitat through the use of a model that extrapolates from the effects of a
decision on a single species to the effects of that decision on all species, or instead
to focus on the effects of the decision on the habitat of a species or group of
species. Moreover, the agency should make efforts to distinguish between the
scientific and non-scientific components of the relevant decision of whether and
how to use a model or other simulation technique. 31 1 Part of the agency's full
disclosure efforts ought to involve explaining the limits of the modeling approach
being considered and describing the assumptions built into the model (and the
policy judgments upon which those assumptions rest).31 2
In addition to being realistic, collaborative, and transparent, any decision-
making process that relies on models or similar simulation techniques to mitigate
the difficulty that bounded rationality imposes on agency decision makers should
be flexible. Because, by definition, the situations in which models are used involve
scientific uncertainty, the existing body of relevant knowledge is likely to change
over time. It makes no sense, therefore, to create an approach to addressing
bounded rationality that is set in concrete. Rather, what is needed is a decision-
310. Keiter, supra note 116, at 324; see also Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense:
Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 249, 299-303
(2005) (commenting that institutions, particularly the courts, should be examined for any
hidden political reasoning behind decisions related to scientific discovery and regulation).
311. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 32, at 1130-31 (arguing that "[i]nstead of remaining
hidden, the non-scientific elements of the listing decision should be consigned to a more
openly political process," and that "[s]uch a process would permit the airing of all relevant
viewpoints, provide a forum to educate the public concerning the range of benefits provided
by species, and ultimately provide a more solid political foundation for conservation
policy").
312. Larson et al., supra note 144, at 116, argue that "[t]he validity of habitat suitability
models may be questionable, and the direct effects of variation in habitat suitability on
wildlife vital rates are often unknown. It is important, therefore, that model users evaluate
these uncertainties and make them explicit, so model results can be interpreted
appropriately." See also Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 971 (contending that "[a] public
participant cannot effectively scrutinize a model-based decision without having some
understanding of the uncertainties involved, and both modelers and planners therefore ought
to be explicit and comprehensive in their discussions of uncertainty"); Kann & Weyant,
supra note 40, at 29 (urging modelers to lay out assumptions inherent in different models
explicitly and be more explicit about the level of confidence they have in model outputs).
Fine and Owen add that
[a] modeling prediction unqualified by disclosure of known, or knowable,
sources of error is fundamentally deceptive. It conveys a level of certainty that
does not exist, hides real risks, and fails to explain key information that ought
to be factored into policy choices and decisions. Without such information,
public debate may be pointless.
Fine & Owen, supra note 7, at 972 (internal footnotes omitted).
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making process that allows the agency to adjust its approach to conform to new
information.
31 3
One means of providing such flexibility (although some have characterized it as
a "trendy" one) is adaptive management.31 4 As Brad Karkkainen has explained:
The argument for adaptive management proceeds from the recognition that
conventional environmental regulation and natural resource management
operate piecemeal, attempting to fraction ecological complexes into smaller,
putatively manageable components, and parceling out management
responsibilities among mission specific agencies and programs. 315
Conservation ecologists, among others, have supported the iterative approach
reflected in an adaptive management-based decision-making regime, based on the
recognition that the policy approaches developed to deal with questions such as
how to protect plant and wildlife diversity are "inescapably provisional and
experimental, subject to subsequent modification in response to new learning and
changing conditions. ' 316 The idea is to use feedback from experience with the
approach initially selected to "pragmatically and continuously adjust both ends and
means in light of experience and learning." 317 The need for flexibility is
313. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 6, at 153 (urging the use of decision-making processes
that "allow mid-course corrections"); Doremus, supra note 1, at 376 (supporting "sufficient
flexibility to permit [the agency] to respond to new information, changed conditions, and the
progressively sharper conflicts that will inevitably characterize environmental problems").
Jamison Colbum argues that federal wildlife habitat laws are not well suited in their current
form to adapt to changing circumstances and to learning in light of experience and that "[a]
more reflexive and pragmatic model is needed if we are to preserve much of the habitat our
wildlife require." Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 57
ALA. L. REV. 417, 498 (2005). For discussion of a variety of pragmatic approaches to
environmental regulation and natural resource management that respond to the need for
agencies to make decisions despite scientific uncertainty, see SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 22, at 147-77; Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, Improving Regulation
Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 1179 (2004)
314. Bosselman, supra note 112, at 496-97. On adaptive management, see generally
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change: Around the Loop and Back Again,
7 MINN. J. L. So. & TECH. 59 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It
Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 21 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management
Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249 (2004);
J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885 (2003);
J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up
the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REv. 933 (1997).
315. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty
Defaults: Towards a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REv. 943, 945-46 (2003).
316. Id. at 943.
317. Id.; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907-08
(2002) (contending that a shift "in the focus of information production from the uncertain
and speculative realm of comprehensive ex ante prediction to the pragmatic empiricism of
observation, measurement, and verification" through the use of management tools such as
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particularly acute in the context of land and resource planning-which is designed
to provide an ongoing framework for resource allocation decisions-given that the
state of the resources being managed is continuously in flux.
318
The NFMA envisions precisely this sort of flexible, iterative management
process. It requires that the Forest Service's regulations for developing LRMPs
"insure research on and (based on continuous monitoring and assessment in the
field) evaluation of the effects of each management system to the end that it will
not produce substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the
land., 319 The provisions of the directives that implement the portions of the 2005
planning regulations which deal with protection of biodiversity fare relatively well
when judged under this criterion. The FSH, for example, states that "[d]evelopment
of plan components for ecosystem diversity and species diversity may be an
iterative process" 320 (although it would have been better to state that the process
should or must be iterative). The FSH also provides that such an iterative process
"may suggest the need for refinement of a proposed plan ... that would then
require additional analysis."
321
An agency's use of modeling or simulation techniques to facilitate its ability to
make decisions in the face of scientific uncertainty must insure that the agency
remains accountable for its choices. Unless the agency is accountable for its
decisions, the normative suggestions for decision making in the face of scientific
uncertainty discussed above will not amount to much. The substantive output of
agency modeling efforts is not likely to improve, for example, if the agency
engages in a collaborative and transparent information-gathering and analytical
process, only to blithely ignore the input it has received by reaching a
predetermined result. Accountability can take one of several forms. 322 Congress has
mechanisms, such as legislative oversight hearings and budgeting decisions, by
which it can seek to avert or reverse agency decisions that frustrate legislative
intent. It is unlikely, however, that Forest Service decisions concerning the
those that employ digital technologies "enables systematic error detection and correction,
early identification of unforeseen circumstances, and ongoing advances in our understanding
of complex natural systems"; as a result, decision making can be situated "on a firmer
pragmatic and empirically grounded footing, and expand the decisionmaker's capacity to
learn and to adjust decisions over time").
318. Cf Bosselman, supra note 112, at 496-97 (stating that "organizations learned from
practical experience that simple extrapolations of history and cadres of professional planners
failed to lead to innovation, adaptation to change, or even survival"); Karkkainen, supra note
315, at 965 (arguing that "efforts at ecosystem management emphasize the need for
experimentation and dynamic adjustment in response to new learning"); Rudd, supra note
261, at 167 (contending that "[t]he varying degrees of uncertainty characterizing the
explanation and prediction of natural phenomena highlight the importance of continually
evaluating models and theories in light of new evidence").
319. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(C) (2000).
320. FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, supra note 212, § 1909.12, ch. 43.26.
321. Id.
322. "Accountability can be roughly defined as the ability of one actor to demand an
explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or punish that
second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation." Edward Rubin, The Myth of
Accountability and the Anti-Democratic Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005).
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formulation and application of models for assessing the impact of agency-approved
management actions on biodiversity will surface on the legislative radar screen.
Realistically, accountability for agency decisions involving modeling or related
simulation techniques to fill scientific data gaps probably depends on meaningful
judicial review. The courts have shown the inclination and the capacity, despite the
technical nature of the questions involved, to overturn decisions in which
environmental agencies applied a model that bore "no rational relationship to the
reality it purport[ed] to represent. 3 23 The courts traditionally adopted an extremely
deferential posture to the review of Forest Service decisions, however, particularly
when the agency made the challenged decisions under multiple use, sustained yield
statutes such as the NFMA.324 In one case involving an attack on Forest Service
planning decisions, for example, the court required the plaintiffs to demonstrate
that "there is virtually no evidence in the record to support the agency's
methodology."
325
Reviewing courts have the capacity to play a more useful function in holding
agencies accountable for science-based decisions than that.326 At a minimum, the
courts must insist that agencies seeking to fill gaps in scientific knowledge through
modeling-type exercises strictly abide by whatever procedural devices Congress
has chosen to impose upon them to facilitate transparent decision making that is
informed by input received through a process that allowed meaningful public
participation. Beyond that, the courts must require that the agencies provide
explanations for their decisions that reveal the assumptions upon which their
models proceeded, as well as descriptions of the remaining scientific uncertainties
and how they affected the agency's choices. Finally, the courts should vacate or
remand agency decisions in which the agency's explanation fails to demonstrate
either that the model used is an appropriate one for dealing with the particular data
gaps the agency is trying to fill, or that a relevant model has been misapplied.32 7
There is some preliminary evidence in the early decisions reviewing the Forest
Service's application of the 2005 planning regulations that the courts may be
willing to undertake each of those tasks.328
323. Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting
Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also supra notes
92-98 and accompanying text.
324. See 3 CoGGiNs & GLICKSMAN, supra note 101, at § 16:5 (stating that "administrative
decisions authorized under multiple use, sustained yield statutes are at present almost
unreviewable, even for abuse of discretion").
325. Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Or. 1993).
326. See Rudd, supra note 261, at 149 (arguing that "[t]raditional judicial deference to
the Forest Service's decision-making processes on scientific issues is insufficient to ensure
that scientific claims are evaluated fairly").
327. Rudd also suggests that courts supplement the administrative record by calling
witnesses and impaneling experts to evaluate agency science-based decisions. Id. at 149,
216-21.
328. See supra notes 294-303 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Environmental and natural resource management agencies should take the
position that when scientific uncertainty hinders their ability to predict the nature of
the impact of their decisions on the public health (or on the health of sustainable
public natural resources such as those found in the national forests), despite
reliance on modeling and evaluation of surrogate trends, the burden of justifying
any activity that poses threats to those resources should be allocated to those who
support agency approval of those activities. 329 The potential for pollution or public
natural resource development to impose irreparable harm should not be ignored or
minimized simply because the nature of the effects of those activities is as of yet
unascertainable. Requiring those supporting agency actions with potentially
damaging environmental effects to bear that burden is consistent with the thrust of
much of the federal environmental and natural resource management legislation
under which these decisions are made, which was adopted in large part to control
speculative risks to health and the environment.
330
329. See, e.g., A NEW PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A PROJECT OF THE CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REGULATION 124 (Christopher
H. Schroeder & Rena Steinzor eds., 2005) (stating that "[w]here uncertainty exists, the
proponent of the potentially degrading activity should bear the burden of proving that the
activity will not cause unacceptable adverse impacts").
330. See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 750-51; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that, to the
extent there is any scientific uncertainty as to what constitutes the "best available scientific
information" for purposes of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), Congress
intended that the FWS, in issuing biological opinions under the ESA, "give the benefit of the
doubt to the species" (quoting Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988)
(quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-697 (1978), as reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572,
2576)).
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